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Abstract
Even before the Great Recession, U.S. employment growth was unimpressive. Between 2000
and 2007, the economy gave back the considerable gains in employment rates it had achieved
during the 1990s, with major contractions in manufacturing employment being a prime contrib-
utor to the slump. The U.S. employment “sag” of the 2000s is widely recognized but poorly
understood. In this paper, we explore the contribution of the swift rise of import competition
from China to sluggish U.S. employment growth. We find that the increase in U.S. imports
from China, which accelerated after 2000, was a major force behind recent reductions in U.S.
manufacturing employment and that, through input-output linkages and other general equi-
librium effects, it appears to have significantly suppressed overall U.S. job growth. We apply
industry-level and local labor market-level approaches to estimate the size of (a) employment
losses in directly exposed manufacturing industries, (b) employment effects in indirectly exposed
upstream and downstream industries inside and outside manufacturing, and (c) the net effects
of conventional labor reallocation, which should raise employment in non-exposed sectors, and
Keynesian multipliers, which should reduce employment in non-exposed sectors. Our central
estimates suggest net job losses of 2.0 to 2.4 million stemming from the rise in import competi-
tion from China over the period 1999 to 2011. The estimated employment effects are larger in
magnitude at the local labor market level, consistent with local general equilibrium effects that
amplify the impact of import competition.
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1 Introduction
During the last decade of the twentieth century—christened the “Roaring Nineties” by Krueger and
Solow (2002)—the U.S. labor market exhibited a vigor not seen since the 1960s. Between 1991 and
2000, the employment-to-population ratio rose by 1.5 percentage points among men, and by more
than 3 percentage points among women. Following five years of rapid wage growth accompanied by
minimal inflation, the national unemployment rate in the year 2000 reached a nadir of 4.0 percent,
its lowest level since 1969. Just one year later, the U.S. labor market commenced what Moffitt
(2012) terms a “historic turnaround” in which the gains of the prior decade were undone. Between
2001 and 2007, male employment rates lost all of their ground attained between 1991 and 2000. The
rapid increase of female employment rates halted simultaneously.1 The growth rate of employment
averaged only 0.9 percent between 2000 and 2007—that is, during the seven years before the onset
of the Great Recession—versus 2.6 percent between 1991 and 2000 (Figure 1).2
This pre-Great Recession U.S. employment “sag” of the 2000s is widely recognized but poorly un-
derstood.3 It coincides with a significant increase in import competition from China. Between 1990
and 2011, the share of world manufacturing exports originating in China increased from 2 percent
to 16 percent (Hanson, 2012). China’s export surge is the outcome of deep economic reforms in the
1980s and 1990s, which were reinforced by the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization
in 2001 (Naughton, 2007). The country’s share in U.S. manufacturing imports has shown an equally
meteoric rise from 4.5 percent in 1991 to 10.9 percent in 2001 before surging to 23.1 percent in 2011.
Simultaneously, after staying relatively constant during the 1990s, U.S. manufacturing employment
declined by 18.7 percent between 2000 and 2007 (Figure 1).4
In this paper, we explore how much of the U.S. employment sag of the 2000s can be attributed
to rising import competition from China. Our methodology builds on recent work by Autor, Dorn
and Hanson (2013a, 2013b), as well as related papers by Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2012),
Pierce and Schott (2013), and Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song (2014). Akin to Pierce and Schott
1See http://www.bls.gov/ilc/#laborforce for data on the size and the employment rate of the working-age popu-
lation.
2The employment series plotted in Figure 1, as well as the employment statistics provided later in this section,
are derived from the County Business Patterns. As detailed below, the County Business Patterns covers all U.S.
employment except for self-employed individuals, employees of private households, railroad employees, agricultural
production employees, and most government employees.
3Moffitt (2012) studies potential causes for the sag including wage levels, age structure, family structure, taxes,
transfers, minimum wage policies, and population health. Only declining male wage rates are found to have substantial
explanatory power. Yet, this explanation leaves unanswered the question of why male wages fell. The concurrence of
falling wages and falling employment-to-population ratios suggests an inward shift in labor demand.
4Using County Business Patterns data, we calculate that U.S. manufacturing employment was 17.0 million in 1991,
17.1 million in 2000, 13.9 million in 2007, and 11.4 million in 2011.
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(2013), we begin our analysis with industry-level empirical specifications.5 This approach enables
us to estimate the direct effect of exposure to Chinese import competition on industry employment
at the U.S. national level. Our direct industry-level employment estimates come from comparing
changes in employment across four-digit manufacturing industries from 1991 to 2011 as a function
of industry exposure to Chinese import competition. The first part of our paper shows that there is
a sizable and robust negative effect of growing Chinese imports on U.S. manufacturing employment.
Quantitatively, our direct estimates imply that had import penetration from China not grown
after 1999, there would have been 560 thousand fewer manufacturing jobs lost through the year
2011. Actual U.S. manufacturing employment declined from 17.2 million workers in 1999 to 11.4
million in 2011, making the counterfactual job loss from the direct effect of greater Chinese import
penetration amount to approximately 10 percent of the realized job decline in manufacturing.
These direct effects do not, however, correspond to the full general equilibrium impact of grow-
ing Chinese imports on U.S. employment, which also encompasses several indirect channels through
which rising exposure to import competition may impact employment levels. One source of indirect
effects, also studied by Pierce and Schott (2013), is industry input-output linkages. These linkages
can create both positive and negative changes in U.S. industry labor demand, generating a net em-
ployment change that is ambiguous in sign. If an industry contracts because of Chinese competition,
it may reduce both its demand for intermediate inputs produced in the United States and its supply
of inputs to other domestic industries. An industry may thus be negatively affected by trade shocks
either to its upstream domestic suppliers or to its downstream domestic buyers. At the same time,
increased imports in upstream industries may lower the cost of obtaining certain inputs, making the
implications of the negative upstream trade shock ambiguous.6 A negative downstream trade shock,
by contrast, should have unambiguously contractionary consequences.
We use the U.S. input-output table for 1992 to construct upstream and downstream trade shocks
for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. Our initial measure of downstream (re-
spectively, upstream) trade shocks for an industry, which sums over the direct shocks to all other
industries using as weights their share in the total output demands of (respectively, their input
supplies to) the industry in question, captures this notion.7 Estimates from this exercise indicate
5NAFTA also contributed to changes in U.S. trade over our sample period. See McLaren and Hakobyan (2010) on
NAFTA’s impacts on U.S. employment patterns. More broadly, Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan and Phillips (2013)
examine the impact of trade in the form of offshoring on the wages of U.S. workers, finding that workers switching
out of manufacturing experience relatively large wage declines.
6Trade shocks to an industry’s suppliers will have negative effects on that industry if, due to specific investments,
existing supply relationships are more productive or are able to provide highly customized inputs as generally presumed
in the industrial organization literature on vertical integration (e.g., Williamson, 1975; Hart and Moore, 1990).
7See Long and Plosser (1983) and Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) for the reasoning
behind this value share definition, which also corresponds to the relevant entries in the input-output tables. A
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sizable negative downstream effects while, consistent with the anticipated ambiguity of upstream
effects, the upstream magnitudes are imprecisely estimated and unstable in sign. Our preferred
measure of indirect trade shocks further accounts not only for shocks to an industry’s immediate
buyers or suppliers, but also for the full set of input-output relationships among all connected in-
dustries (e.g., shocks to an industry’s buyers, its buyers’ buyers, etc). Applying this direct plus
full input-output measure of exposure increases our estimates of trade-induced job losses for 1999
to 2011 to 985 thousand workers in manufacturing alone, and to 1.98 million workers in the entire
economy. Thus, inter-industry linkages magnify the employment effects of trade shocks, doubling the
size of the impact within manufacturing and producing an equally large employment effect outside
of manufacturing.
Our second empirical strategy, which focuses on local labor markets, is motivated by the fact
that analysis at the level of national industries fails to capture two other potentially important
and opposing general equilibrium channels. One such additional channel is a reallocation effect from
growing trade with China, which works through the movement of factors of production from declining
sectors to new opportunities, and potentially counteracts any negative direct or industry linkage
effects. In both Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner models of international trade, stronger import
competition for one sector reduces the relative price of its final good and induces the reallocation
of labor and capital to sectors whose relative prices have increased (Feenstra, 2003). Under fully
inelastic labor supply, no labor market frictions, and other neoclassical assumptions which ensure
that the aggregate economy is always at full employment, reallocation effects would, by definition,
exactly offset direct, upstream and downstream effects so as to restore full employment. However,
with imperfections in labor and other markets, there is no guarantee that reallocation effects will be
sufficient to restore employment to the same level that would have emerged in the absence of trade
growth from China.
An additional general equilibrium channel operates through aggregate demand effects, multiplying
the negative direct and indirect effects of import growth from China. Through familiar Keynesian-
type multipliers, domestic consumption and investment may be depressed, extending employment
losses to sectors not otherwise exposed to import competition. A negative effect of increased import
competition on aggregate demand necessarily requires that employment reallocation in response to a
negative trade shock is incomplete, such that aggregate earnings decline and this decline is multiplied
throughout the economy via demand linkages.
We jointly estimate reallocation and aggregate demand effects (in net) at the level of local
detailed derivation is provided in the Appendix.
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labor markets by exploiting the impact of trade shocks within U.S. commuting zones (CZs). If the
reallocation mechanism is operative, then when an industry contracts in a CZ as a result of Chinese
competition, some other industry in the same labor market should expand. Some component of
aggregate demand effects should also take place within local labor markets, as shown by Mian
and Sufi (2014) in the context of the recent U.S. housing bust: if increased trade exposure lowers
aggregate employment in a location, reduced earnings will decrease spending on non-traded local
goods and services, magnifying the impact throughout the local economy. Because aggregate demand
effects also have a national component, which our approach does not capture, focusing on local labor
markets is likely to provide a lower bound on the sum of reallocation and aggregate demand effects.8
Empirically, our second strategy examines changes in employment in CZs that have different
levels of exposure to Chinese competition by virtue of differences in their initial pattern of industrial
specialization, a strategy also used by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013a). The reallocation effect
should result in a greater expansion of employment in non-exposed industries—meaning non-tradable
industries as well as tradable industries not significantly exposed to trade with China. Surprisingly,
we find no robust evidence for this effect: the estimated impact of import competition on employment
in non-exposed industries is very modest in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The reallocation of employment into non-exposed industries appears to be swamped by the adverse
effect of the aggregate demand channel, which presumably inhibits labor reabsorption.
Our estimates of local general equilibrium effects imply that import growth from China between
1999 and 2011 led to an employment reduction of 2.4 million workers, inclusive of employment
changes within non-exposed sectors. Consistent with the idea that import competition may have
negative general equilibrium effects on local employment, this figure exceeds our national-industry-
level estimate of the direct and indirect disemployment effects of rising import exposure mentioned
above. As noted below, neither the CZ-level nor the national estimate fully incorporates all of the
adjustment channels encompassed by the other. The national-industry estimates exclude reallocation
and aggregate demand effects, whereas the CZ estimates exclude the national component of these
two effects, as well as the non-local component of input-output linkage effects. Because the CZ-
level estimates suggest that general equilibrium forces magnify rather than offset the effects of
import competition, we view our industry-level estimates of employment reduction as providing a
8Of course, reallocation effects may also have a national component due to the movement of labor across regions.
As we discuss in Section 2, in practice there appears to be little response of local labor supply to location-specific
increases in import competition from China (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013a; Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song, 2014),
leading us to view reallocation effects as being primarily local in nature. Another complicating factor is that, in the
presence of labor and product market imperfections, the decline of an industry in the local labor market may lead to
the expansion of some tradable industries in other labor markets, making the local reallocation effects a lower bound
on the aggregate reallocation effects.
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conservative lower bound.
Our analysis of the aggregate employment consequences of import competition builds on the re-
cent work of Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013a, 2013b) by expanding their CZ-level analysis to include
analysis at the level of national industries, a dimension they do not consider, and by characterizing
the alternative mechanisms—reallocation versus changes in aggregate demand—through which trade
induces employment decline at the local level. Our national-industry approach is similar in spirit to
Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2012) and Pierce and Schott (2013). Pierce and Schott, in particu-
lar, explore how China’s 2001 WTO accession affected U.S. manufacturing employment. Our paper,
while complementary to theirs, expands the analysis to include the transmission of trade shocks
to non-manufacturing sectors and the estimation of employment effects resulting from reallocation
across sectors and changes in aggregate demand.
We begin in Section 2 by outlining the conceptual framework that motivates our empirical
analysis. Section 3 describes our empirical approach to estimating the effects of exposure to trade
shocks and briefly discusses the data. Section 4 gives our primary OLS and 2SLS estimates of
the impact of trade shocks on employment, and also considers additional labor market outcomes.
Section 5 expands the analysis to include intersectoral linkages. Section 6 presents estimation results
for data on local labor markets. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains the derivation of our
downstream and upstream trade shocks from a simple general equilibrium model with input-output
linkages and also contains additional empirical results and robustness checks.
2 Conceptual Framework
We start with a brief outline of the conceptual framework that motivates our empirical work. Con-
sider a simple decomposition of the total national employment impact of increased Chinese trade
exposure:9
National employment impact = Direct impact on exposed industries
+ Indirect impact on linked industries
+ Aggregate reallocation effects
+ Aggregate demand effects
9We follow the standard practice in such decompositions and fold the “covariance” terms into the “main effects”
(so that the magnitudes are not independent of the order in which these different terms are evaluated).
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Here, the direct impact is the reduction in employment in industries whose outputs compete with
imports from China. Added to this direct effect is an indirect effect arising because other industries
linked to the impacted industry through the input-output matrix are also likely to see changes in out-
put.10 For example, the chemical and fertilizer mining industry—which is in non-manufacturing—
sells 74% of its output to the manufacturing sector. Its largest single manufacturing customer is
industrial organic chemicals not elsewhere classified, which accounts for 15% percent of its sales.
Similarly, the iron and ferroalloy ores industry sells 83% of its output to the manufacturing sector,
two thirds of which goes to the blast furnace and steel mill industry. Accordingly, a shock to the de-
mand for a given domestic manufactured good is likely to indirectly impact demand for, and reduce
employment in, industries, whether in manufacturing or non-manufacturing, that supply inputs to
the affected industry. We refer to these linkages as downstream trade shocks, which affect industries
through import competition in sectors that are located downstream of them in input-output space.11
Conversely, a trade shock to the suppliers of a given industry (e.g., the upstream suppliers of
tires to the automobile industry) may also affect the industries that are its customers. The direction
of this effect is generally ambiguous. On the one hand, from the perspective of purchasing industries,
the trade shock expands input supply and puts downward pressure on input prices, and thus may
tend to expand employment in the industries that consume these inputs (Goldberg, Khandelwal,
Pavcnik and Topalova, 2010).12 On the other hand, the trade shock may destroy existing long-term
relationships for specialized inputs as domestic input suppliers are driven out of business, creating
a force towards contraction in the industries that were their customers. We refer to such linkages as
upstream trade shocks, whereby industries are affected by import competition facing the industries
that are located upstream of them in the production chain. We estimate these effects on linked
industries using the input-output matrix of the U.S. economy as described below.
We begin our empirical analysis with industry-level regressions that estimate the direct impact
of import competition on employment in exposed industries (Section 4), and subsequently add the
indirect employment impacts arising from input-output linkages between industries (Section 5). The
industry-level analysis thus captures the first two components of the aggregate national employment
effect, the direct impact on exposed industries plus the indirect impact on linked industries. The
10See, among others, Long and Plosser (1983) and Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) on the
propagation of shocks through the input-output network of the economy.
11Unfortunately, the terminology of downstream and upstream effects is open to confusion, since downstream
(upstream) effects which work through shocks to downstream (upstream) industries are those that propagate upstream
(downstream).
12Consistent with this reasoning, De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2014) find substantial negative
domestic product price effects from trade liberalization in India, and Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova
(2010) document that greater availability of imported intermediate inputs is associated with more rapid introduction
of new product varieties by domestic firms, also in the Indian context.
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industry-level regressions do not, however, encompass the third and the fourth components of the
national employment effect: the reallocation effect, which captures the potential increase in employ-
ment from the expansion of other industries to absorb the factors of production freed by contracting
industries, and the aggregate demand effect, which corresponds to the impact of Keynesian-type
multipliers operating through local or national shifts in consumption and investment.13
To obtain estimates of the magnitudes of these two additional effects, we turn in Section 6 to
local labor market analysis, focusing on the employment impact of increased import competition
from China at the commuting zone level. The total employment effect observed in a local labor
market can be decomposed as:
Local employment impact = Direct impact on exposed industries
+ Local impact on linked industries
+ Local reallocation effects + Local demand effects
We hypothesize that the direct impact at the local level, when scaled appropriately by the size of
the industry in the local labor market, is comparable to the direct impact estimated at the national
level. The other three effects could potentially differ between the local and the aggregate levels. For
instance, even though linked industries tend to co-locate (e.g., Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr, 2010), only
part of the input-output linkages will be within the same local labor market, and the local impact
on linked industries may thus be much smaller than the aggregate effect.
What makes our local labor market analysis informative is that local reallocation and local
demand effects are linked to their aggregate counterparts. Consider the reallocation effects first.
Local labor markets are a plausible unit of analysis for the study of this channel. As a local
labor market experiences a loss of jobs when local industries contract in response to rising import
competition, there should be an adjustment of quantities within the same labor market, despite the
fact that prices are, at least in part, determined in the national or the international equilibrium. If
the extent of worker migration between local labor markets in response to these labor market shocks
is modest, as suggested by the evidence in Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013a), Notowidigdo (2013),
and Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song (2014), this adjustment will take the form of reallocation from
13It is in theory possible for the aggregate demand effect to be positive; for instance, aggregate demand may increase
because the aggregate price level declines as a result of the lower costs of imported products from China. We view this
positive channel as second-order and in general presume that the aggregate demand effect, working in the standard
Keynesian fashion, amplifies the potential negative direct impact of trade shocks. This is consistent with the results
from our local labor market, which indicate that the sum of reallocation and demand effects is negative.
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declining industries to others within this locale.14
An important component of aggregate demand effects also plausibly takes place within local
labor markets. Mian and Sufi (2014) show that during the Great Recession, U.S. counties suffering
large wealth losses because of particularly severe declines in housing values also saw large declines
in employment, consistent with local transmission of shocks to aggregate demand. Components of
the aggregate demand effect that operate at the national level will not be captured by our analysis,
however, as they will be common across locations. Our empirical strategy seeks to identify the
combined impact of reallocation and aggregate demand effects by quantifying how trade-induced
shocks impact a commuting zone’s employment in non-exposed industries—defined as industries
that are not exposed to imports from China either through direct product market competition or
through inter-industry purchases of intermediate inputs.
Overall, this discussion suggests that our local labor market strategy will provide an informative
alternative estimate of the aggregate employment impact of greater import competition from China,
though this is likely to be an underestimate of the aggregate effects because it ignores part of the
impact on linked industries and also excludes demand effects that have no counterpart at the local
level. In what follows, we will separately compute the implied aggregate effects consisting of the sum
of the direct impact and the impact on linked industries from our national-industry-level analysis,
and the total employment impact from the local analysis.
3 Empirical Approach
Sweeping economic reforms initiated in the 1980s and extended in the 1990s permitted China to
experience rapid industrial productivity growth (Naughton, 2007; Hsieh and Ossa, 2011; Zhu, 2012),
rural to urban migration flows in excess of 150 million workers (Li, Li, Wu, and Xiong, 2012),
and massive capital accumulation (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang, 2012), which together
caused manufacturing to expand at a breathtaking pace. What did this growth mean for U.S.
employment inside and outside manufacturing? We seek to capture the changes in U.S. industry
employment induced by shifts in China’s competitive position and the subsequent increase in its
exports, accounting for input-output linkages between industries and other indirect channels of
transmission. We subsequently consider how these labor demand shifts can be aggregated to national
totals.
14Complementing this U.S.-based evidence, Balsvik et al. (2014) and Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2014) document
weak labor mobility responses to trade-induced employment shocks in Norway and Brazil, respectively. As discussed
in footnote 8, there are some components of reallocation that might take place outside the local labor market.
8
3.1 Industry Trade Shocks
Our baseline measure of trade exposure is the change in the import penetration ratio for a U.S.
manufacturing industry over the period 1991 to 2011, defined as
∆IP jτ =
∆MUCj,τ
Yj,91 +Mj,91 − Ej,91 , (1)
where for U.S. industry j, ∆MUCjτ is the change in imports from China over the period 1991 to 2011
(which in most of our analysis we divide into two subperiods, 1991 to 1999 and 1999 to 2011) and
Yj,91+Mj,91−Ej,91 is initial absorption (measured as industry shipments, Yj,91, plus industry imports,
Mj,91, minus industry exports, Ej,91). We choose 1991 as the initial year as it is the earliest period
for which we have the requisite disaggregated bilateral trade data for a large number of country pairs
that we can match to U.S. manufacturing industries.15 The quantity in (1) can be motivated by
tracing export supply shocks in China—due, e.g., to productivity growth—through to demand for
U.S. output in the markets in which the United States and China compete. Supply-driven changes
in China’s exports will tend to reduce demand for and employment in U.S. industries.
One concern about (1) as a measure of trade exposure is that observed changes in the import
penetration ratio may in part reflect domestic shocks to U.S. industries that affect U.S. import
demand. Even if the dominant factors driving China’s export growth are internal supply shocks,
U.S. industry import demand shocks may still contaminate bilateral trade flows. To capture this
supply-driven component in U.S. imports from China, we instrument for trade exposure in (1) with
the variable
∆IPOjτ =
∆MOCj,τ
Yj,88 +Mj,88 −Xj,88 (2)
where ∆MOCj,τ is the growth in imports from China in industry j during the period τ (in this case
1991 to 2011 or some subperiod thereof) in eight other high-income countries excluding the United
States.16 The denominator in (2) is initial absorption in the industry in 1988. The motivation for
the instrument in (2) is that high-income economies are similarly exposed to growth in imports from
China that is driven by supply shocks in the country. The identifying assumption is that industry
import demand shocks are uncorrelated across high-income economies, and that there are no strong
15Our empirical approach requires data not just on U.S. trade with China but also on China’s trade with other
partners. Specifically, we require trade data reported under Harmonized System (HS) product codes in order to match
with U.S. SIC industries. The year 1991 is the earliest in which many countries began using the HS classification.
16These countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland, which
represent all high-income countries for which we can obtain disaggregated bilateral trade data at the Harmonized
System level back to 1991.
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increasing returns to scale in Chinese manufacturing (which might imply that U.S. demand shocks
will increase efficiency in the affected Chinese industries and induce them to export more to other
high-income countries).17
Appendix Figure 1 plots the value in (1) against the value in (2) for all U.S. manufacturing
industries at the four-digit level, as defined below, which is equivalent to the first-stage regression in
our subsequent estimation without detailed controls. The coefficient is 0.98 and the t-statistic and
R-squared are 7.0 and 0.62 respectively, indicating the strong predictive power of import growth in
other high-income countries for U.S. import growth from China.18
A potential concern about our analysis is that we largely ignore U.S. exports to China, focusing
primarily on trade flows in the opposite direction. This is for the simple reason that our instrument,
by construction, has little predictive power for U.S. exports to China. Nevertheless, to the extent
that our instrument is valid, our estimates will correctly identify the direct and indirect effects of
increased import competition from China (this is in particular because there is no reason for trade
to balance at the industry or region level, so we do not need to simultaneously treat exports to China
in our analysis). We also take comfort from the fact that imports from China are much larger—
approximately five times as large—as manufacturing exports from the United States to China (Figure
2).19
3.2 Data Sources
Data on international trade for 1991 to 2011 are from the UN Comtrade Database,20 which gives
bilateral imports for six-digit HS products. To concord these data to four-digit SIC industries, we
first apply the crosswalk in Pierce and Schott (2012), which assigns 10-digit HS products to four-digit
SIC industries (at which level each HS product maps into a single SIC industry), and aggregate up
to the level of six-digit HS products and four-digit SIC industries (at which level some HS products
17See Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013a) and Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song (2014) for further discussion of threats
to identification using this instrumentation approach.
18Modeling the China trade shock as in equation (1) does not exclude the role of global production chains. During
the 1990s and 2000s, approximately half of China’s manufacturing exports were produced by export processing plants,
which import parts and components from abroad and assemble these inputs into final export goods (Feenstra and
Hanson, 2005). Our instrumental variable strategy does not require China to be the sole producer of the goods it ships
abroad; rather, we require that the growth of its gross manufacturing exports is driven largely by factors internal to
China (as opposed to shocks originating in the United States), as would be the case if, plausibly, the recent expansion
of global production chains involving China is primarily the result of its hugely expanded manufacturing capacity.
19A second rationale for our import focus is data constraints. Much of U.S. exports to China are in the form
of indirect exports via third countries or embodied services of intellectual property, management expertise, or other
activities involving skilled labor. These indirect and service exports are difficult to measure because the direct exporter
may be a foreign affiliate of a U.S. multinational or because they occur via a chain of transactions involving third
countries. As such exports tend to be intensive in highly skilled labor, they may have only modest direct impacts on
the employment of production workers—though their indirect impacts are difficult to gauge with available data.
20See http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx.
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map into multiple SIC industries). To perform this aggregation, we use data on U.S. import values
at the 10-digit HS level, averaged over 1995 to 2005. The crosswalk assigns HS codes to all but
a small number of SIC industries. We therefore slightly aggregate the four-digit SIC industries so
that each of the resulting 397 manufacturing industries matches to at least one trade code, and
none is immune to trade competition by construction. To ensure compatibility with the additional
data sources below, we also aggregate together a few additional industries such that our final data
contains 392 manufacturing industries. All import amounts are inflated to 2007 U.S. dollars using
the Personal Consumption Expenditure deflator.
Our main source of data on U.S. employment is the County Business Patterns for the years 1991,
1999, 2007 and 2011. CBP is an annual data series that provides information on employment, firm
size distribution, and payroll by county and industry. It covers all U.S. employment except self-
employed individuals, employees of private households, railroad employees, agricultural production
employees, and most government employees.21
To supplement the employment and establishment count measures available from the CBP, we
utilize the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database for the years 1971 through 2009 (the latter
being the latest year available).22 These data allow us to explore labor market outcomes not reported
in the CBP, as well as to perform a falsification exercise not possible in the CBP. We additionally
draw on the NBER-CES data to compute measures of the production structure in each industry,
subsequently used as controls, including: production workers as a share of total employment, the log
average wage, the ratio of capital to value added, computer investment as a share of total investment,
and high-tech equipment as a share of total investment. Additionally, we create industry pre-trend
controls for the years 1976 through 1991, including the changes in industry log average wages and
in the industry share of total U.S. employment.
A final data source used in our analysis is the 1992 input-output table for the U.S. economy
(from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis), which we use to trace upstream and downstream
demand linkages between industries both inside and outside of U.S. manufacturing.23 We discuss
our application of input-output tables in more detail below.
21CBP data is extracted from the Business Register, a file of all known U.S. companies that is maintained by the
U.S. Census Bureau; see http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/index.html. To preserve confidentiality, CBP information
on employment by industry is sometimes reported as an interval instead of an exact count. We compute employment
in these cells using the fixed-point imputation strategy developed by Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013a).
22The NBER-CES database contains annual industry-level data from 1958-2009 on output, employment, payroll
and other input costs, investment, capital stocks, TFP, and various industry-specific price indexes (Becker, Gray, and
Marvakov, 2013). Data and documentation are at http://www.nber.org/data/nberces5809.html.
23These data are at http://www.bea.gov/industry/io_benchmark.htm.
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4 Estimates of the Direct Impact of Trade Exposure on Employ-
ment
We begin by estimating the direct effect of trade exposure on employment over the period 1991
through 2011 using aggregate, industry-level regressions.
4.1 Baseline Results for National Industries
Our initial specification is of the following form:
∆Ljτ = ατ + β1∆IP jτ + γXj0 + ejτ , (3)
where ∆Ljτ is 100 times the annual log change in employment in industry j over time period τ ;
∆IP jτ is 100 times the annual change in import penetration from China in industry j over period
τ as defined in (1); Xj0 is a set of industry-specific start of period controls (specified later); ατ is a
period-specific constant; and ejτ is an error term. We fit this equation separately for stacked first
differences covering the two subperiods 1991-1999 and 1999-2011, where in some specifications we
shorten the second subperiod to 1999-2007 in order to evaluate employment impacts prior to the
onset of the Great Recession. Variables specified in changes (denoted by ∆) are annualized since
equation (3) is estimated on periods of varying lengths. The elements in the vector of controls Xj0,
when included, are each normalized with mean zero so that the constant term in (3) reflects the
change in the outcome variable conditional only on the variable of interest, ∆IP jτ . Most outcome
variables are measured at the level of 392 four-digit manufacturing industries, while later models
also estimate spillovers to 87 non-manufacturing industries. Regression estimates are weighted by
start-of-period industry employment, and standard errors are clustered at the three-digit industry
level to allow for arbitrary error correlations within larger industries over time.24
Table 1 summarizes the import exposure and employment variables used in initial estimates of
equation (3). The employment-weighted mean industry saw Chinese import exposure rise by 0.5
percentage points per year between 1991 and 2011, with more rapid penetration during 1999 through
2007 than during 1991 through 1999: 0.8 versus 0.3 percentage points, respectively. Growth from
2007 to 2011, at 0.3 percentage points per year, indicates a marked slowdown in import expansion
in the late 2000s. The slowdown during that period is the combined effect of a steep decline in U.S.
24There are 135 three-digit manufacturing industry clusters encompassing the 392 four-digit industries. Because
our non-manufacturing data have already been extensively aggregated to 87 industries for concordance with the BEA
input-output table, we treat each of the 87 non-manufacturing industries as a single cluster.
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trade in 2008 and 2009 and an equally dramatic recovery in 2010 (Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar,
2010), which together left import penetration rates modestly higher.25
Changes in import penetration are highly right-skewed across manufacturing industries, with
the mean increase exceeding the median by a factor of 3.5. We find a similar pattern of import
penetration change and skewness in the other high-income countries used to construct the import
penetration instrument, where this skewness reflects China’s strong comparative advantage in labor-
intensive industries. Table 1 also shows that the manufacturing decline accelerated throughout the
sample: the average industry contracted by 0.3 log points per year between 1991 and 1999, by 3.6 log
points per year between 1999 and 2007, and by 5.7 log points per year in the final period 2007 to 2011.
The within-industry growth rate of non-manufacturing employment also slowed across the three
subperiods of our sample, but the deceleration was not nearly as pronounced as in manufacturing.
Table 2 presents a simple stacked first-difference model for the two time periods 1991-1999 and
1999-2011, with the change in import penetration and a dummy for each time period as the only
regressors. Alongside these estimates, we also present results from stacking the time periods 1991-
1999 and 1999-2007, and from fitting the model separately for the three subperiods 1991-1999,
1999-2011, and 1999-2007. These additional specifications permit inspection of results before and
after the commencement of the 2000s U.S. employment sag, and allow for comparison of the results
for the 2000s with and without including the Great Recession years. We also present results for the
single long difference, 1991-2011, for comparison against the stacked first differences.
In column 1, which excludes the import penetration variable, the time dummies reflect the
(employment-weighted) mean annual within-industry change in employment in each period. Column
2 adds the observed import exposure measure without instrumentation. This variable is negative
and highly significant, consistent with the hypothesis that rising import penetration lowers domes-
tic industry employment. Nevertheless, as noted above, this OLS point estimate could be biased
because growth in import penetration is driven partly by changes in domestic supply and demand.
Column 3 mitigates this simultaneity bias by instrumenting the observed changes in industry import
penetration with contemporaneous changes in other-country China imports as specified in equation
(2) above. The estimate in column 3 implies that a one percentage point rise in industry import pen-
etration reduces domestic industry employment by 1.3 percentage points (t-ratio of 3.2). Column 4,
which stacks the periods 1991-1999 and 1999-2007, shows that the coefficient of import penetration
25Explanations for the excess sensitivity of trade flows during the Great Recession include the role of shocks to the
credit market and trade finance (Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Chor and Manova, 2012), and to the global production
networks (Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar, 2010). Other explanations dwell on the large drop in durable good spending
during the crisis (Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis, 2011).
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is very similar if we restrict attention to the years preceding the Great Recession.
The remaining columns of Table 2 present bivariate estimates of this relationship separately
by subperiod. The coefficient on trade exposure is negative and statistically significant in all time
periods, and is largest in absolute value for 1991 to 1999 and smallest for 1999 to 2007. Even though
the sensitivity of employment to import penetration is greater before 2000, the much faster growth
in China’s imports after 2000 produces an overall impact of trade on employment that, as we discuss
below, is considerably larger in the latter period. The sensitivity of employment to trade from 1999
to 2011 is similar to the estimate for 1999 to 2007, despite the onset of the global financial crisis in
2007 and the associated dislocation of worldwide trade patterns.26
A simple long-difference model for the change in manufacturing employment over the full 1991
through 2011 period (column 8) also supports a negative relationship between import penetration
and U.S. manufacturing employment. The coefficient estimates in column 3, for the stacked first
differences, and column 8, for the long time difference, are quite similar, reflecting strong persistence
in the growth in China’s import penetration within industries. Replacing stacked first differences
with the long difference may remove cyclical variation in the data, accounting for the mildly larger
coefficient estimates in the latter case.
Returning to the results in column 3 of Table 2, we evaluate the economic magnitude of these
estimates by constructing counterfactual changes in employment that would have occurred absent
increases in Chinese import competition. Using equation (3), we write the difference between actual
and counterfactual manufacturing employment in year t as
∆Lcft =
∑
j
Ljt
[
1− e−βˆ1∆I˜P jt
]
, (4)
where βˆ1 is the 2SLS coefficient estimate from (3) and ∆I˜P jt is the increase in import penetration
from China that we attribute to China’s improving competitive position in industry j between 1991
(or 1999) and year t. Following Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013a), we estimate ∆I˜P jt by multiplying
the observed increase in import penetration ∆IP jt with the partial R-squared from the first-stage
regression of (1) on the instrument in (2), which has a value of 0.56 in our baseline specification in
column 3 in Table 2. When our instrument is valid and there is no measurement error, this partial
R-squared adjusted ∆I˜P jt variable is a consistent estimate of the contribution of Chinese import
26In the United States, imports plus exports divided by GDP fell by a stunning 22% from the first quarter of
2008 to the first quarter of 2009. However, imports fully recovered in 2010 and continued to grow in 2011. The
exaggerated cyclical swings in trade surrounding the Great Recession thus mix with the continued secular growth in
China’s exports to the United States over the period.
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supply shocks to changes in import penetration. In constructing the counterfactuals, we further
assume that all other factors, including observed covariates and unobserved shocks captured by the
error term in (3), would be unaffected by the artificially imposed reduction in the growth of import
penetration from China.
We collect these counterfactual estimates in Table 8, where we compare employment estimates
across three different estimation strategies. The first row of Table 8 reports counterfactual employ-
ment differences implied by the estimates in Table 2, where we evaluate changes for 1991 to 1999,
1999 to 2011, and the entire 1991 to 2011 period. Using coefficient estimates from column 3, we
calculate that had import penetration from China remained unchanged between 1991 and 2011,
manufacturing employment would have fallen by 837 thousand fewer jobs over the full 1991 to 2011
span, and by 560 thousand fewer jobs during the employment sag era of 1999 to 2011. Observed man-
ufacturing employment changes over these time periods were minus 5.6 million workers (11.4 million
- 17.0 million) and minus 5.8 million workers (11.4 million - 17.2 million), respectively. The larger
quantity for the second period is indicative of the modest growth in manufacturing employment
of 200 thousand workers that occurred between 1991 and 1999. By shutting down China’s import
growth, the contraction of U.S. manufacturing employment suggested by our estimates would have
been 14.9 percentage points smaller over 1991 to 2011, and 9.7 percentage points smaller for the
period after 1999. It is also worth noting that counterfactual reductions in employment for the pe-
riod 1991-2007—based on the specification in column 4 of Table 2—amount to 853 thousand, quite
similar to our estimates for 1991-2011.
4.2 Comparison to Other Estimates in the Literature
How do our estimates of the direct effect of import competition on manufacturing employment
compare with those found the literature? There are few estimates to consider, as the majority of
work on the labor market implications of globalization addresses not the absolute employment effects
of trade, but its impact on relative wages and relative employment levels by skill (e.g., Harrison,
McLaren, and McMillan, 2011). Trade impacts on absolute employment levels are a less common
object of study, perhaps reflecting modeling conventions that impose inelastic labor supply and full
employment.
In an influential treatment of trade impacts on U.S. manufacturing, Bernard, Jensen, and Schott
(2006) estimate that import penetration from low-income countries—with China being the largest
member of this group by far—accounts for 14% of the total decline in manufacturing employment
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of 675 thousand workers that occurred between 1977 and 1997.27 Their specification differs from
ours, making a direct comparison of the two sets of results difficult to perform. They regress the
change in log employment at the level of the manufacturing plant (rather than industry) on the
initial level (rather than change) of the share of low income countries in industry imports (rather
than the import penetration rate). Despite these differences, Bernard, Jensen, and Schott find a
relatively high sensitivity of employment to import competition. But over their period of study, the
annual increase in import penetration from low income countries in U.S. manufacturing was only
0.09 percentage points,28 whereas over our sample period the annual increase in import penetration
from China alone was 0.50 percentage points (Table 1). Had their much lower level of import growth
obtained over our sample period, the reduction in manufacturing job loss implied by our coefficient
estimates would have been only one-fifth as large.29 One reason why Bernard, Jensen, and Schott’s
analysis may produce higher estimates of the impact of imports on employment than ours is that
they study plant-level data as compared to our industry-level regressions. Aggregating across plants
within an industry is preferable in this instance because it avoids confounding aggregate effects with
within-industry reallocation, which take place as some workers may exit declining plants to take
jobs with establishments in their same sector (consistent with the results in Autor, Dorn, Hanson
and Song, 2014).
Pierce and Schott (2013) test whether manufacturing employment growth after 2001 (a business
cycle peak) is low relative to employment growth following previous business cycle peaks (in 1981
and 1990) for plants that faced a larger potential increase in import competition from China. They
measure this potential increase in China trade using the difference between the U.S. MFN (most
favored nation) tariff and the U.S. non-MFN tariff—to which China was potentially subject prior
to becoming a WTO member and whose level was substantially higher than the MFN duty. Pierce
and Schott thus identify the growth in China trade after 2001 using the notional reduction in U.S.
trade barriers confronting China. A complication with this approach is that the U.S. granted China
MFN status on a renewable basis in 1980, two decades prior the country’s WTO accession. The
U.S. non-MFN tariff is only a meaningful predictor of China’s pre-2001 trade to the extent that
there was genuine risk the U.S. government would choose not to renew China’s MFN privileges, an
27In related work, Artuc, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010) evaluate how costs to workers of moving between sectors
dampen the employment response to changes in trade barriers, and Muendler and Becker (2010) and Harrison and
McMillan (2011) estimate the responsiveness of employment in multinational companies to changes in foreign wages.
This work tends to emphasize the elasticity of employment with respect to changes in trade barriers or foreign
production costs, rather than producing estimates of aggregate impacts of foreign competition on employment.
28This figure comes from information provided in Table 2 of Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006).
29This ratio is based on the calculation,
(
1− e−1.30×.56×.09) / (1 − e−1.30×.56×.50) = 0.21, where the value −1.30 is
the coefficient from column 3 of Table 2 and the value .56 discounts observed changes in import penetration by the
partial R-squared of the first stage.
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eventuality that never materialized. Pierce and Schott estimate that China’s WTO accession reduced
U.S. manufacturing employment by 15.6 log points between 2001 and 2007.30 Our estimates, which
identify the impact of growth in China’s imports based on the common component of the country’s
export expansion across high-income markets, imply that had there been no increase in import
penetration from China after 1999, the 2011 level of employment would have been 4.9 percent higher
(.560m/11.4m) than it otherwise would have been. Comparing our results in Table 2 to Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott (2006) and to Pierce and Schott (2013) thus suggests that our estimates for the
direct industry-level employment effects of China trade are on the low side.
4.3 Controlling for Industry Confounds and Pre-trends
A challenge for our analysis is that industries subject to greater import competition may be exposed
to other economic shocks that are correlated with China trade. We begin to address this concern
in Table 3 by incorporating controls for potential industry confounds. We additionally offer a set of
falsification tests.
We consider three groups of control variables. First, we probe the robustness of our results
by including dummies for ten one-digit manufacturing sectors. Since our regressions are in first
differences, the inclusion of these dummies amounts to allowing for differential trends across these
one-digit sectors. Regressions including these dummies therefore identify the industry-level impacts
of trade exposure while purging common trends within the one-digit sectors and using only variation
in import growth across industries with relatively similar skill intensities.
Technological progress within manufacturing has been most rapid in recent decades in computer
and skill-intensive sectors (Doms, Dunne, and Troske, 1997; Autor, Katz, and Krueger, 1998). To
capture the extent to which industries are exposed to technical change, we next add a second set
of control variables, drawn from the NBER-CES database, measuring the intensity of their use of
production labor and capital. These variables, summarized in Appendix Table 1, include the share
of production workers in total employment, the log of the average wage, the ratio of capital to value
added (all measured in 1991), as well as computer and high-tech equipment investment in 1990, each
expressed as a share of total 1990 investment.
U.S. manufacturing as a share of employment has been declining since the 1950s, and the num-
ber of manufacturing employees has also trended downward since the 1980s. This long-standing
secular trend highlights a concern that the correlation we document between rising industry trade
30This estimate is from column 6 of Table 2 of their paper, which we view as closest in spirit to the specifications
in our paper.
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penetration and contemporaneous, within-industry declines in manufacturing employment during
1991 through 2011 could potentially pre-date the recent rise in import exposure. In that case, our
estimates would likely overstate the impact of trade exposure in the current period. We therefore
finally add measures of pre-trends in industry employment and earnings in Table 3, specifically the
change in the industry’s share of total U.S. employment, and the change in the log of the industry
average wage, both measured over the interval 1976 to 1991 (Appendix Table 1).
The first seven columns of Table 3 permute among combinations of these three groups of in-
dustry controls: the one-digit sector dummies, industry-level controls for production structure, and
industry-level controls for pre-trends. Column 1 replicates results from column 3 of Table 2 to serve
as a benchmark. Among the additional groups of covariates, only the one-digit sector dummies
have a substantial impact on the point estimates, reducing the (instrumented) estimates by about
40 percent.31 Though the inclusion of the sectoral dummies is an important robustness check for
our results, there are two reasons why these specifications may underestimate the impact of Chinese
import competition. First, trade exposure at the four-digit industry level is likely to be measured
with error, and the inclusion of the one-digit sector dummies will then cause significantly greater
attenuation of our estimates of the impact of Chinese import growth. Second, if there is a significant
increase in imports in some industries within a one-digit sector (say, in women’s dresses within tex-
tiles), then employers in other similar industries within this broad sector (say, women’s blouses and
shirts, also within textiles) may anticipate greater competition both from the substitutes already
being imported from China and also from future waves of Chinese imports, and thus will be more
likely to downsize and close existing plants and less likely to open new plants. By contrast, neither
the production nor the pre-trend variables have an important effect on the magnitude or precision of
the coefficient of interest. As a further robustness test, column 8 includes a full set of dummies for
the 392 four-digit manufacturing industries in our data. These variables serve as industry-specific
trends in our stacked first-difference specification, so the effect of import competition on industry
employment in this specification is identified by changes in the growth rates of industry employment
and import penetration in 1999-2011 relative to 1991-1999. Remarkably, relative to specifications
that include one-digit sector dummies, the addition of an exhaustive set of industry-specific trends
only modestly reduces the point estimate and precision of the coefficient of interest, thus highlight-
ing the robustness of the relationship. In summary, while our preferred industry-level model from
31Quantitatively, the specification in column 2 of Table 3 implies that had import penetration from China remained
unchanged between 1991 and 2011, manufacturing employment would have fallen by 463 thousand jobs over the full
1991 to 2011 span, and by 307 thousand jobs between 1999 and 2011, which are about 45% lower than our baseline
numbers.
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column 3 of Table 2 allows for an impact of Chinese trade competition on employment both within
and across broad manufacturing subsectors, the estimates in Table 3 document that a sizable nega-
tive employment effects remains even when focusing only on the within-subsector or within-industry,
over-time variation in trade exposure.
As a falsification exercise, Table 4 reports results from a regression of changes in industry em-
ployment in earlier decades on the instrumented change in industry import exposure between 1991
and 2011. It would be problematic for our identification strategy if future growth in Chinese import
exposure predicted industry employment declines in the era prior to China’s trade opening.32 Panel
A performs this exercise without additional covariates, while panel B controls for ten one-digit sector
dummies. In both panels, the estimated relationship between our China trade exposure measure
and industry employment is statistically insignificant and close to zero in both the 1970s (1971-1981)
and 1980s (1981-1991). The point estimate only becomes economically large and statistically signif-
icant after 1990. This pattern of results is consistent with the hypothesis that the within-industry
correlation between rising import penetration and declining manufacturing employment in the 1990s
and 2000s emanates from contemporaneous trade shocks rather than long-standing factors driving
industry decline.
4.4 Additional Employment and Establishment-Level Outcomes
We have so far focused on the effects of trade exposure on industry employment, which is but one
margin along which industries adjust. Others include the wage bill, establishment size, establishment
shutdown, and production versus non-production employment and earnings. Using a combination
of CBP and NBER-CES data, we explore these outcomes in Table 5.
Given our findings on how import penetration affects employment in Tables 2 and 3, many of
the results in Table 5 are in line with expectations. Stronger import competition reduces the count
of establishments (column 2), average employment per establishment (column 3), and total industry
wage payments (column 4). Production employment (column 6) declines slightly more than non-
production employment (column 7), indicating a larger sensitivity to Chinese import competition
on the part of lower skilled labor, a result consistent with China’s strong comparative advantage in
labor-intensive sectors.
32To carry the analysis back to 1971, we employ the NBER-CES data, which covers a longer time horizon than
the County Business Patterns data used in our main estimates. A disadvantage is that the NBER-CES database is
currently only updated through 2009, two years less than the CBP. To improve comparability, we use the NBER data
in all columns of Table 4, including for the post-1990 period (unlike in Tables 2 and 3, where we use CBP data).
These estimates also differ from those in Tables 2 and 3 in that the import exposure variable (and its instrument)
corresponds to the long 1991-2011 change in all columns.
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The table also contains some informative surprises. Trade exposure predicts a rise in real industry
log wages for production workers (column 8)—that is, the real production worker wage bill divided
by the production worker headcount. The impact on non-production worker wages (column 9) is
negative but small and not statistically significant. Joining these two effects produces the positive
but insignificant coefficient estimate for average real wages (column 5). The results for production
workers that combine strongly negative employment effects and mildly positive average wage effects
are suggestive of trade-induced changes in the composition of employment. Less highly paid workers
may be those more likely to be laid off within the subgroup of production employees, leading to an
upward shift in wages among those still employed as a result of unobserved changes in composition.
This interpretation is consistent with Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song’s (2014) finding that the
earnings of lower wage workers are most adversely affected by greater import competition.33
5 Accounting for Sectoral Linkages
We now expand the scope of the inquiry to encompass the effects of trade shocks on employment in
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries working through input-output linkages. In
the Appendix, we present a simple model of Cobb-Douglas production that yields expressions for
changes in industry employment resulting from downstream and upstream import exposure. Here
we discuss the empirical implementation of these downstream and upstream effects.
To study these inter-industry linkages, we envisage an economy along the lines of that studied
by Long and Plosser (1983) and Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012), where
each industry uses with different intensities the output of other industries as inputs. We apply this
methodology to the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ input-output table for 1992. We choose the 1992
input-output table since it largely predates the China trade shock and hence measures linkages that
are unlikely to be endogenous to the subsequent shock.
To estimate the change in import penetration that a given industry faces due to direct linkages
33Appendix Table 2 also reports the impact of Chinese import competition on industry output, measured as the
value of shipments. In panel A, we find that import exposure has an economically and statistically significant negative
effect on nominal shipments (column 1), but when we decompose this effect into changes in real shipments and changes
in the shipments price deflator (columns 2 and 3), we find no effect on real shipments. This surprising pattern turns
out to be driven by computer-producing industries, which experienced rapid growth in real value added, precipitous
declines in output prices, and substantial increases in Chinese import penetration during our sample period. In panel
B, where we exclude 28 computer-producing industries corresponding to NAICS 334, we find comparable effects on
nominal shipments, but these effects are now driven primarily by relative declines in real shipments in trade-exposed
industries, rather than by relative declines in output prices. We view these results as consistent with a mounting body
of evidence that computer-producing industries have an outsized influence on measured output and productivity in
the manufacturing sector (Houseman, Bartik, and Sturgeon 2014; Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price 2014).
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with its downstream buyers, we calculate the following quantity for each industry j,
∆IPDjτ =
∑
g
wDgj∆IPgτ , (5)
which is equal to the weighted average change in import penetration during time interval τ across
all industries, indexed by g, that purchase from industry j. These weights wDgj are defined as
wDgj =
µUgj∑
g′ µ
U
g′j
, (6)
where µUgj is the 1992 “use” value in the BEA input-output matrix for the value of industry j’s
output purchased by industry g, such that the weight in (6) is the share of industry j’s total
sales that are used as inputs by industry g. Thus, (5) is a weighted average of the trade shocks
faced by the downstream purchasers’ of j’s output.34 When industry j’s purchasers—that is, its
downstream buyers—suffer a negative trade shock, they are likely to reduce demand for j’s output.
The theoretical justification for these expressions is provided in the Appendix using a simple model
of input-output linkages.
Similarly, to compute the direct upstream shock ∆IPUjτ faced by each industry j—that is, the
average of the trade shocks faced by the industries from which j purchases inputs—we make the
same calculation after reversing the j and g indexes in numerator of (6).35 We instrument both the
upstream and downstream trade shocks analogously to our main import shock measure: using con-
temporaneous changes in China imports in eight other high-income countries to calculate predicted
upstream and downstream shocks for each industry, where these predictions serve as instruments
for the measured domestic values. Concretely, we construct these instruments by replacing the term
∆IPgτ with ∆IPOgτ in equation (5), while retaining the same weights.
Equation (5) accounts for the direct (first-order) effect on output demand of an industry j
stemming from trade-induced changes in demand from its immediate downstream buyers. But it
ignores further indirect effects on industry j’s demand stemming from changes in demand from its
34We use the BEA “make” table to assign commodities to the industries that produce them. The summation in the
denominator of equation (6) runs over not only manufacturing industries, but also non-manufacturing industries as
well as final demand. Since our direct shock variable only reflects manufacturing trade, all downstream shocks to a
sector emanate by definition from shocks to their downstream manufacturing purchasers (that is, ∆IPgτ is defined
to equal zero for non-manufacturing industries and for final demand). These shocks affect both manufacturing and
non-manufacturing industries to the degree that they supply inputs to manufacturing industries g that are directly
shocked.
35When we construct weights for the upstream shocks, the summation in the denominator again runs over industry
j’s total sales. Analogously to the case of downstream shocks, upstream shocks—that is, shocks to the suppliers of
goods to a given sector—emanate from trade shocks to these industries’ suppliers in manufacturing (though, as just
noted, both manufacturers and non-manufacturers may have upstream suppliers in manufacturing).
21
buyers’ buyers, and so on. To account for the full chain of linked downstream and upstream demands,
we replace ∆IPDjτ and ∆IP
U
jτ (and their instruments) with the full chain of implied responses from
the input-output matrix, which is given by the Leontief inverse of the matrix of downstream and
upstream linkages (see, e.g., Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2012). The details
of this computation are given in the Appendix.
Upstream and downstream exposure measures are summarized in Appendix Table 3. As ex-
pected, the indirect exposure measures are substantially smaller in magnitude, and have far less
cross-industry variation, than the direct exposure measures. In the average manufacturing industry,
the direct trade shock is five times as large as the first-order upstream shock and over three times as
large as the first-order downstream shock. Incorporating higher-order linkages significantly increases
the magnitude of the upstream and downstream exposure measures. The full indirect downstream
exposure measure (given by the Leontief inverse) is approximately half as large as the direct exposure
measure, while the full indirect upstream exposure measure is about one-third as large as the direct
exposure measure.
The two panels of Table 6 present instrumental variables estimates of the effects of import
exposure on industry employment, akin to those in Table 3 column 1 (without the one-digit sector
dummies) and column 2 (with the one-digit sector dummies), here augmented with the upstream
and downstream import exposure measures. The upper panel of Table 6 employs the first-order
upstream and downstream measures, ∆IPDjτ and ∆IP
U
jτ , while the lower panel uses the full Leontief
exposure measures. We present results with and without the one-digit sector dummies introduced
earlier.36
Columns 1 through 3 of Table 6 consider the impact of upstream and downstream linkages on
employment in the 392 manufacturing industries; columns 4 and 5 consider these impacts on employ-
ment in the 87 non-manufacturing industries; and columns 6-10 present results for manufacturing
and non-manufacturing pooled. All regressions employ the stacked first differences specification:
columns 1 through 8 and 10 cover the time periods 1991 to 1999 and 1999 to 2011, while column 9
shortens the second period to 1999 - 2007. Upstream industry effects are not statistically significant
in any specification, and are unstable in sign, showing up as positive in the manufacturing only
specification (column 2) and negative in the non-manufacturing and pooled specifications (columns
5 and 7).37 This imprecision may be due to the fact that the upstream effects combine the offsetting
36We do not include the industry production and pre-trend controls used in Table 3 since these were shown to have
little effect conditional on sector dummies but still absorb degrees of freedom, which is problematic in a setting with
multiple instrumented endogenous variables that are themselves correlated.
37Additionally, the upstream effect in manufacturing reverses sign (while remaining insignificant) when the down-
stream variable is omitted. Observe that there is no ‘direct’ trade exposure effect in non-manufacturing since our
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effects of reduced domestic input supply (due to U.S.-based suppliers curtailing shipments in the
face of increased import competition) and increased foreign input supply. Given the instability of
effects working through upstream linkages, we focus our attention on the downstream effects, which
are, in contrast, quite stable across specifications and are qualitatively similar for manufacturing
and non-manufacturing sectors.
Consistent with our reasoning above, growth in an industry’s downstream trade exposure is
found to reduce industry employment. For manufacturing industries alone, the coefficient of the
downstream linkage effect is quite large without the one-digit sector dummies in the regression (col-
umn 2), and of similar magnitude to the direct trade shock coefficient as well as more precisely
estimated when the one-digit sector dummies are added in column 3. For non-manufacturing indus-
tries, downstream linkages are also negative and statistically significant (columns 4 and 5), and larger
in magnitude than the estimates for manufacturing. Pooling manufacturing and non-manufacturing,
coefficients on downstream linkages are negative and statistically significant either without (columns
6 and 7) or with (column 8) the one-digit sector dummies included in the regression.38 Results for
the period 1991-2007 (column 9) are quantitatively similar.
Finally, in the last specification in Panel B (column 10), we regress changes in industry employ-
ment on the sum of the direct and downstream trade shocks, which is the form suggested by our
theoretical model in the Appendix. As expected, the estimated coefficient on the combined shock
lies between the coefficients on the direct and downstream shocks in column 6.39
Comparing across the two panels of Table 6, which employ the first-order (panel A) and full
(panel B) downstream and upstream measures, we detect a similar pattern of coefficient estimates.
In all cases, the coefficients on the full exposure measures are smaller in magnitude than those on
the first-order exposure measures, though they are also more precisely estimated. Of course, the full
exposure measures are considerably larger in magnitude than the first-order exposure measures, so
the smaller coefficients do not imply smaller quantitative effects.
Accounting for downstream linkages substantially increases the impact of trade shocks on em-
ployment. Using estimates from the regression that pools manufacturing and non-manufacturing
together (column 6, the specification without one-digit sector dummies), we evaluate the counterfac-
trade measures are confined to manufactured goods.
38The non-manufacturing estimates do not include sector dummies (unlike the manufacturing estimates) since our
non-manufacturing industry scheme is already highly aggregated and, moreover, does not collapse down readily to a
one- or two-digit sector scheme since we had to extensively aggregate four-digit SIC industries for concordance with
the input-output tables used by the BEA.
39We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on this combined variable is the same as the separate co-
efficients on the direct and the downstream exposure measures in column 2. The implied quantitative magnitudes
(reported below) are also very similar regardless of whether we use this combined measure or separate measures for
direct and indirect downstream effects.
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tual change in employment analogous to the exercise in equation (4), with the results again shown
in Table 8. This new exercise combines the employment impacts of trade shocks working through
direct effects and indirect effects associated with downstream linkages.40 Had import competition
from China remained unchanged between 1991 and 2011, according to our estimates from panel A
(using only first-order downstream effects), there would have been 1.33 million additional workers
employed in manufacturing and 805 thousand additional workers employed in non-manufacturing,
for a total employment differential of 2.14 million workers. Examining just the 1999 to 2011 period,
the corresponding counterfactual employment additions are 928 thousand in manufacturing and 653
thousand in non-manufacturing, for a total of 1.58 million additional workers employed. Accounting
for the full set of direct and indirect downstream effects shown in our preferred specification (panel
B, column 6), we obtain employment estimates that are larger again: 1.41 million workers in manu-
facturing, 1.22 million in non-manufacturing, and 2.62 million overall for 1991 through 2011; and 985
thousand workers in manufacturing, 994 thousand in non-manufacturing, and 1.98 million overall
for 1999 through 2011. These combined direct and indirect effects of increased Chinese imports are
substantially larger than the direct effects alone (837 thousand workers for 1991 to 2011, and 560
thousand workers for 1999 to 2011). Thus, accounting for downstream linkages inside and outside of
manufacturing more than triples the estimated direct employment effects for manufacturing alone.41
These estimated magnitudes do not, however, include the full general equilibrium impact of trade
exposure as they fail to capture aggregate reallocation and demand effects as outlined above. We
turn to local labor market analysis to obtain estimates of these additional adjustment mechanisms.
6 Local General Equilibrium Effects of Trade on Employment
Our industry-level analysis, which compares changes in relative employment among industries with
differing levels of trade exposure, is not well-suited to identifying the reallocation and demand effects
discussed in the Introduction and Section 2. In this section, we attempt to quantify the reallocation
and aggregate demand effects by applying an alternative strategy that focuses on the implications
40Consistent with the analysis of Section 4, these counterfactuals assume that 56% of the observed growth in direct
and indirect import exposure is attributable to the Chinese supply shock.
41The specification in column 8, which controls for ten one-digit manufacturing sector dummies, implies somewhat
smaller employment effects. According to our estimates from panel B (accounting for the full set of direct and
downstream effects), had import competition from China remained unchanged between 1991 and 2011, there would
have been 857 thousand additional workers employed in manufacturing and 821 thousand additional workers employed
outside of manufacturing, for a total employment gain of 1.68 million workers. For the 1999 to 2011 period, the
corresponding counterfactual employment additions are 597 thousand in manufacturing and 670 thousand in non-
manufacturing, yielding total employment gains of 1.27 million. These numbers are about 35% smaller than our
baseline estimates incorporating the indirect downstream effects.
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of rising import competition from China on employment in local labor markets
6.1 Empirical Approach
To exposit the logic of our approach, consider a simplified setting in which each commuting zone (CZ)
houses up to three sectors that have no input-output linkages: toys, footwear, and construction.42
Toys and footwear experience an increase in imports from China, so we label these sectors as exposed.
Construction does not experience this shock and we label it non-exposed. If a particular CZ has
many workers employed in toys prior to the rise of import competition from China, it will experience
significant worker displacement as this sector contracts.43 Due to the reallocation effect, we would
expect displaced workers to gain employment in another sector. This sector is unlikely to be footwear,
however, since it is simultaneously facing rising import competition. In this simple setting, labor
within the commuting zone should therefore reallocate towards construction. Estimating by how
much employment in construction expands in this CZ as toys and footwear decline can help us to
assess the positive general equilibrium effects resulting from reallocation.
Employment in construction may be affected by a second channel as well: the potentially negative
Keynesian aggregate demand multiplier, stemming from reductions in local economic activity. In
our simple example, the initial reduction in employment in exposed industries will reduce local
incomes and, via this channel, may depress local demand for new home construction or renovation,
further depressing employment.44 The net effect of these reallocation and aggregate demand effects
on employment in construction may be positive or negative.
Now suppose that the third industry in this economy is not construction but chemicals, which un-
like construction, is tradable within the United States across local labor markets and, as it happens,
has not been subject to significant increases in import competition from China. To make progress
in this case, suppose that our local labor markets can be thought of as small open economies within
the United States, so that prices of tradables are determined at the U.S. level (or on world markets).
This does not change the reallocation effect, but it may alter the aggregate demand effect. Even if
aggregate demand for non-tradables in the local labor market is depressed, there might be an in-
crease in local employment in chemicals, the output of which is then sold to residents in other CZs.
42The choice of construction as the non-traded sector is motivated in part by Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo
(2013), who find that the 2000-2007 housing boom helped local labor markets absorb workers displaced from manu-
facturing.
43This discussion also makes it clear that empirically, it is appropriate to combine the shocks of all of the local
industries using weights related to their local employment shares, which is the strategy employed here and in Autor,
Dorn and Hanson (2013a).
44It is possible for trade-induced price declines to simultaneously contribute to aggregate demand by spurring
additional consumption or investment as discussed in footnote 13.
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This is simply a reflection of the fact that the component of the negative aggregate demand effect
working at the national level will not be easily identified from variation across local labor markets.
An implication of this observation is that our strategy will tend to underestimate the aggregate
demand effect, to the degree it operates nationally rather than locally.
6.2 Estimates
The local labor market analysis is based on 722 CZs that cover the entire U.S. mainland. These CZs
are clusters of counties with strong internal commuting ties (see Tolbert and Sizer, 1996, and Autor
and Dorn, 2013).
We begin by estimating stacked first-difference models for changes in CZ employment-to-population
rates of the following form:
∆Eiτ = ατ + β∆IP
CZ
iτ + γXi0 + eiτ (7)
Here, the dependent variable ∆Eiτ is equal to 100 times the annual change in the ratio of employment
to working-age population in CZ i over time period τ ; Xi0 is a set of CZ-by-sector start-of-period
controls (specified later); ατ is a time effect; and eiτ is an error term.45 The key explanatory variable
in this model is ∆IPCZiτ , which measures a CZ’s annual change in exposure to Chinese imports over
period τ . The coefficient β reveals the impact of import exposure on overall employment rates,
combining employment shifts in both trade-exposed and non-exposed industries. We define a CZ’s
change in import exposure as a local employment-weighted average of changes in import exposure:
∆IPCZiτ =
∑
j
Lijτ
Liτ
∆IP jτ . (8)
In (8), ∆IPjτ is the measure of Chinese import competition used in our industry-level analysis, and
Lijτ/Liτ is industry j’s start-of-period share of total employment in CZ i.46 The variation in ∆IPCZiτ
across local labor markets stems entirely from variation in local industry employment structure at
the start of period τ . As with our industry-level estimates, a concern is that realized U.S. imports
from China in (8) may be correlated with industry import demand shocks. We again instrument
for growth in Chinese imports to the U.S. using the contemporaneous growth of Chinese imports in
45Throughout this section, local employment is derived from the County Business Patterns, and local working-age
population (ages 15-64) is derived from the Census Population Estimates.
46This is similar to Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013a) and Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song (2014), except that for
consistency with our industry-level analysis, we normalize industry-level imports by initial U.S. market volume instead
of initial employment.
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eight other developed countries as specified in (2).47 Appendix Table 4 summarizes CZ-level changes
in exposure to Chinese imports and in employment-to-population rates.
To gauge the differential impact of import exposure on different types of industries within local
labor markets, we decompose employment changes into three broad sectoral groupings. Specifically,
we interact the CZ’s change in import exposure with indicator variables for exposed industries,
non-exposed tradable industries, and other non-exposed industries:
∆Eikτ = αkτ + β1∆IP
CZ
iτ × 1 [Exposedk] + β2∆IPCZiτ × 1 [Non-Exposed Tradablek] (9)
+ β3∆IP
CZ
iτ × (1− 1 [Exposedk]− 1 [Non-Exposed Tradablek]) + γXik0 + eikτ .
In these regressions, ∆Eikτ is the change in employment of sector k in CZ i, expressed in percentage
points of working-age population. While the specification in (9) is similar to that in Autor, Dorn, and
Hanson (2013a), it differs importantly by separating the employment effects of import competition
in CZs according to sector import exposure and tradability. To compute ∆Eikτ , we assign each
industry to one of the three mutually exclusive sectors: exposed industries, non-exposed tradable
industries, and other non-exposed industries. First, we define the exposed sector to encompass
all manufacturing industries for which predicted import exposure rose by at least 2 percentage
points between 1991 and 2011, as well as all industries (both within and outside of manufacturing)
for which predicted full downstream import exposure increased by at least 4 percentage points
over 1991-2011.48 Relative to an exposure definition based only on own-industry import exposure,
incorporating downstream linkages expands the exposed sector to include additional manufacturing
industries, as well as industries outside of manufacturing that sell a sizable portion of their outputs
to import-exposed manufacturing firms. For example, the latter group includes forestry, wholesale
trade, miscellaneous repair services, and chemical and fertilizer mining.49 All other industries are
designated as non-exposed. Following our simple example of construction versus chemicals as non-
exposed industries, we next subdivide the non-exposed sector into tradables and non-tradables.
47Our expression for non-U.S. exposure to Chinese imports, which serves as an instrument for ∆IPCZiτ , differs
from the expression in equation (8) in that in place of realized changes in U.S. import exposure (∆IPjτ ), we use the
analogous expression based on realized imports from China to other high-income markets (∆IPOjτ ). In addition,
we use 1988 employment counts for the construction of the instrument to reduce the error covariance between the
dependent and independent variables.
48Predicted import exposure is computed from first-stage estimates of equation (3) over the single long period
1991-2011.
49Despite this broad definition of the exposed sector, our regression analysis in this section will only partially
capture the indirect effects working through input-output linkages we directly estimated previously. While pairs of
industries linked through input-output relationships tend to co-locate (e.g., Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr, 2010), many
firms purchase and sell inputs beyond the boundaries of their commuting zone, and thus any local strategy will exclude
a potentially sizable fraction of these indirect effects.
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In our nomenclature, tradable industries are those that produce tradable goods or commodities,
and specifically comprise the manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining sectors. We
classify all other sectors, including services, as non-tradable, though this approach is admittedly
imperfect since some services are also traded.50
Table 7 presents our estimates. The first set of specifications in columns 1 through 3 pool
employment across all sectors to determine the impact of import exposure in local labor markets
on overall employment. Column 1 considers the relationship between CZ import exposure and
changes in CZ employment-to-population rates without additional controls. The strongly negative
and statistically significant point estimate in this column indicates that a one percentage point
increase in the average import penetration of local industries reduces the employment rate among
a CZ’s working-age population by 1.64 percentage points. We refine the estimates and explore
robustness in the next pair of columns by controlling for the initial manufacturing employment
share in a local labor market (column 2) and for nine Census divisions (column 3). By controlling
for local manufacturing intensity, we allow for differential employment trends in the manufacturing
and non-manufacturing sectors, as we do in our industry-level estimates of Table 6. The controls
for Census divisions allow for heterogeneity in regional time trends. Adding these covariates has a
modest impact on the trade coefficient, which remains sizable and statistically significant at -1.70
in column 3.
The regressions of columns 4 through 6 disaggregate the overall employment effects of columns 1
through 3 into their sectoral components. Consistent with the results of the industry analysis, column
4 shows a strongly negative and statistically significant effect of import exposure on local labor
market employment in trade-exposed industries. The point estimate indicates that a one percentage
point increase in local import exposure reduces the share of a CZ’s working-age population employed
in exposed industries by 1.95 percentage points. Between 1999 and 2011, mean CZ import exposure
rose by 1.21 percentage points, while employment in exposed industries declined by 3.64 percentage
points of working-age population. The estimate in column 4 thus implies that 1.32 percentage points
(or 36 percent) of this fall can be explained by rising Chinese import competition.51
As our conceptual discussion anticipates, the estimate in column 4 also shows some offsetting
employment growth in non-exposed industries, corresponding to the net impact of local reallocation
50The exposed sector consists of 293 industries (285 in manufacturing and 8 outside of manufacturing), which
together comprised 20.2 percent of 1991 U.S. employment. The non-exposed tradable sector consists of 113 industries
(107 in manufacturing, 6 outside of manufacturing), comprising 6.7 percent of 1991 employment. Finally, the non-
exposed non-tradable sector consists of 73 industries (all outside manufacturing) accounting for 73.1 percent of 1991
employment.
51As above, this calculation discounts the growth of imports by the partial R-squared of 0.56 of the first stage
regression: 1.32 = 0.56 × 1.21× 1.95.
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and Keynesian demand effects. However, the offsetting employment effect is substantially smaller
than the employment reduction in exposed industries and is never statistically significant. These
estimates suggest that employment gains through the sectoral reallocation effect are largely offset by
negative aggregate demand effects. In parallel with our specifications examining overall employment
impacts, we refine the estimates in the next pair of columns by controlling for initial local labor
market manufacturing intensity (column 5) and Census divisions (column 6), with the coefficients
on these controls allowed to vary by sector. Adding these covariates only modestly changes the
estimated negative impact of import exposure on employment in exposed industries, while the small
and imprecise estimates for offsetting employment gains decline to almost zero. The final columns
replicate the specifications from columns 3 and 6 over the stacked periods 1991-1999 and 1999-2007.
The results are similar to those for the full sample period and suggest negative effects of trade
competition on employment in exposed industries, combined with small and insignificant effects in
non-exposed sectors.
While our estimates suggest the presence of strong aggregate demand effects that limit employ-
ment gains in the non-exposed sectors of trade-exposed local labor markets, we would anticipate that
these local demand effects primarily impact employment in the non-traded sector rather than the
non-exposed tradable sector. Our results however provide scant evidence for differential employment
impacts in the two non-exposed sectors. In columns 4 and 5, the point estimates for non-tradables
exceed the point estimate for non-exposed tradables; in columns 6 and 8, the relationship is reversed.
Why does reallocation fail to accord more clearly with the simple reasoning outlined in Section
6.1? It is conceivable that the small increase in employment in non-tradable sectors detected in
columns 4 and 5 (though not in column 6) may be related to the rapid rise in the U.S. aggregate
trade deficit during our sample period (Figure 2), a substantial part of which reflects a growing trade
imbalance with China. In response to import competition, an open economy normally reallocates
resources out of some tradable industries into others, at least under balanced trade. If, however, the
trade shock is accompanied by a rise in the trade deficit, then the reallocation from exposed tradables
into non-exposed tradables may be delayed, shifting employment into non-tradables instead—that
is, the deficit may fuel increasing expenditure in the domestic economy, part of which falls on non-
tradable consumption. While this reasoning is not inconsistent with a long-run reallocation towards
non-exposed tradables, the large and growing U.S. trade deficit during the period under study
may have significantly slowed down such a reallocation. This reasoning is, unfortunately, silent on
why a rising U.S. trade deficit coincided with China’s growing import penetration. It nevertheless
underscores that shifts in global imbalances may complicate the simple adjustment mechanism we
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posit.
Quantitatively, the estimates in column 6 of Table 7 encompass four impacts of Chinese trade
competition on local labor market employment: direct employment effects in exposed industries,
indirect employment effects via local input-output linkages between industries, local reallocation
effects, and local aggregate demand effects. As summarized in Table 8, the coefficient estimates
imply that had import competition from China not increased after 1999, trade-exposed industries
in local labor markets would have avoided the loss of 2.35 million jobs. Comparing this quantity
to the outcome of our national-industry analysis, it is modestly larger than the employment effect
derived from Table 6B reported above, which incorporated both the direct and the downstream
effects of import competition and tallied employment reductions in trade-exposed manufacturing
and non-manufacturing industries at 1.98 million jobs. The fact that employment effects on exposed
industries in CZs are slightly larger than the direct and indirect effects of import competition in
national industries is suggestive of negative local aggregate demand spillovers. Such spillovers imply
that multipliers operating at the local level suppress demand in non-exposed industries as well,
inducing further employment declines in trade-exposed industries.
Our estimates imply near zero, though imprecisely estimated, employment effects of trade ex-
posure on non-exposed industries. Absent further increases in import penetration from China after
1999, the results summarized in Table 8 show that non-exposed industries would have shed 18
thousand fewer jobs. Combining figures from exposed and non-exposed industries, the overall local
impact is 2.37 million jobs whose loss would have been averted absent further increases in Chinese
import competition after 1999. With the numerous caveats acknowledged, our conceptual frame-
work in Section 2 suggests that this estimate is a lower bound on the aggregate total impact of
increased import competition from China on national employment. In particular, this estimate does
not include the components of industry interlinkage effects and aggregate demand effects that work
at the national level. This lower bound estimate is relatively close to the jobs lost based on our
industry-level analysis in Table 6B (shown in Table 8), which combines direct competition effects
and inter-industry linkages with non-manufacturing sectors. Recall that Table 6B’s industry-level
estimate of the jobs lost (shown in Table 8) does not include reallocation and aggregate demand
effects. Since our analysis in this section indicates that employment losses due to negative aggregate
demand effects dominate employment gains due to reallocation effects, our industry-level estimates
of employment reduction should indeed be lower bounds.52
52In particular, recall that the industry-level numbers could underestimate the net employment losses due to aggre-
gate demand effects or overestimate these losses due to reallocation effects. But if reallocation effects are modest and
swamped by demand effects at the local level, as suggested by the Table 7 estimates, we would also expect the demand
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7 Concluding Discussion
In the years leading up to the Great Recession, overall U.S. employment growth was slow and manu-
facturing employment experienced a steep contraction. In this paper, we investigate the contribution
of the rise in import competition from China to this employment “sag”.
We begin by estimating the direct effect of trade competition on employment in manufacturing
industries that are differentially exposed to growing Chinese import penetration, and then expand the
analysis to include multiple general equilibrium channels through which trade exposure may affect
employment: other sectors might be impacted because they are related to the affected sectors through
input-output linkages; employment may reallocate away from trade-exposed industries toward non-
exposed industries; and Keynesian-type aggregate demand spillovers may significantly magnify the
direct competition effect.
In our analysis of U.S. national industries, we construct upstream and downstream trade shocks
for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. We expect downstream shocks to contribute
to further job losses, while the impact of upstream shocks is ambiguous. Consistent with these ex-
pectations, we find large negative employment responses to trade exposure in downstream industries
and unstable effects of exposure in upstream industries.
As a complementary strategy, we assess the impact of Chinese trade on U.S. commuting zones
to jointly estimate reallocation and aggregate demand effects at the local level. Theoretically, if an
industry contracts in a local labor market because of Chinese competition, then, barring substantial
interregional migration, some other industry in the same labor market should expand. In addition,
part of any aggregate demand spillovers will also accrue to the local labor market. Our estimates
show sizable job losses in exposed industries, and few if any offsetting job gains in non-exposed
industries, a pattern that is consistent with substantial job loss due to aggregate demand spillovers.
Our results are a first step in quantifying the employment impact of increasing import compe-
tition on the U.S. labor market. Several questions remain unanswered that could be addressed in
future work. Using plant-level data to achieve a finer distinction between tradable and non-tradable
industries would enable both a sharper test of the implications of local general equilibrium inter-
actions, and a separate quantification of reallocation and aggregate demand effects. We should in
particular see employment declines in non-tradables due to local aggregate demand spillovers, but no
differential decline in tradables except through geographically-concentrated input-output linkages.
This perspective could elucidate how local and national labor markets respond to growing import
effects to dominate at the aggregate level—especially since these demand effects are themselves underestimated at the
local level.
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competition, in particular allowing us to determine to which degree shocks propagate locally or at
the national level.
We finally note that, though our paper has focused on the contribution of rising international
competition to the U.S. “employment sag” of the 2000s, we have had comparatively less to say
about the impact of trade during the Great Recession. As shown in Figure 2, U.S. imports from
China dropped sharply in 2009. This might imply that exporters to the United States—China
in particular—absorbed part of the demand shock accompanying the Great Recession that would
otherwise have further reduced U.S. employment (albeit from a notionally higher base). While this
hypothesis is intuitive, additional exploration of U.S. manufacturing data suggests otherwise. We find
that U.S. manufacturing industries that were heavily exposed to Chinese import competition during
the 1999 to 2007 period continued to see rapid, differential employment declines during 2007 to 2011,
despite the fact that there was almost no correlation between industry-level changes in trade exposure
during 1999 to 2007 and changes in trade exposure during 2007 to 2011.53 This pattern suggests
that the trade shocks of the prior decade cast a long shadow over U.S. manufacturing, even when
trade pressure eased temporarily. One explanation for this long shadow is that U.S. manufacturers
recognized that the loss in comparative advantage in the sectors that China had penetrated in the
prior decade was largely permanent whereas the lull in trading activity was temporary. Indeed, as
shown in Figure 2, U.S. imports from China more than made up all of their ground lost in 2009 by the
following year, and then rose further from there. Thus, trade pressure appears to have contributed to
the U.S. employment sag not just before, but also during the Great Recession, despite the temporary
drop off of international trading activity during this period. Though much evidence suggests that
rising labor costs in China augur a reduction in trade pressure in the years ahead (Li, Li, Wu, and
Xiong, 2012), our analysis suggests that this particular Chinese export has yet to reach U.S. shores.
Appendix A: Derivation of the Downstream and Upstream Effects
In this Appendix, we briefly outline the justification for the specifications we use for the upstream
and downstream effects in Section 5 of the paper.
53When we regress 100 x the annual log change in manufacturing industry employment between 2007 and 2011 on
changes in Chinese import competition between 2007 and 2011 and between 1999 and 2007 (expressed as percentage
points of 1991 U.S. market volume), we find
∆̂Lj,07−11 = −5.02
(0.52)
− 1.06
(0.40)
×∆IPj,99−07 + 0.59
(0.67)
× ∆IPj,07−11.
This substantial impact of Chinese import competition between 1999 and 2007 on 2007-2011 employment growth
suggests a pattern of delayed declines in employment in affected industries. We obtain similar results if we control for
ten one-digit sector dummies.
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Consider a static perfectly competitive economy with n industries, and suppose that each indus-
try j = 1, ..., n has a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form
yj = l
αlj
j k
αkj
j
n∏
i=1
x
aji
ji . (A1)
Here xji is the quantity of goods produced by industry i used as inputs by industry j. We assume
that, for each j, αlj > 0, α
k
j > 0, and aji ≥ 0 for all i, and that
αlj + α
k
j +
n∑
i=1
aji = 1,
so that the production function of each industry exhibits constant returns to scale.
The output of each industry is used as input for other industries or consumed in the final good
sector. In addition, there are also imports from abroad (say China), and we ignore exports for
simplicity (and thus also ignored is the trade balance condition). The market clearing condition for
industry j can then be written as
yj = cj +
n∑
k=1
xkj −mj , (A2)
where cj is final consumption of the output of industry j, and mj denotes total imports.
The preference side of this economy is summarized by a representative household with a utility
function
u(c1, c2, ..., cn).
We focus on the competitive equilibrium of this economy.
Given the constant returns to scale production function of each sector specified in (A1), prices
satisfy the zero profit conditions of the n sectors in the competitive equilibrium.
The cost minimization problem of industry j (given competitive markets) implies that
aji =
pixji
pjyj
, (A3)
where pj is the price of the output of industry j. This expression makes it clear that aji’s also
correspond to the entries of the input-output matrix. For future reference, let us define nominal
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values (which are more useful for several of the expressions below) with tildes. For example,
x˜ji ≡ pixji, y˜j ≡ pjyj , and m˜j ≡ pjmj .
Let us now suppose that there is an exogenous increase in {mi}ni=1. To simplify the discussion,
suppose that any increase in imports translates into a direct reduction in domestic production
without any changes in prices.
We first derive the downstream effects, that is, how a given industry i is affected by changes
in imports to its customers. To start with, let us also ignore the second- and higher-order input-
output linkages, and focus on first-order impacts. In that spirit, let us approximate the impact of
the increase in imports in industry j on domestic production in the same industry by
dy˜j ≈ −dm˜j . (A4)
(Why this is an approximation will be clear below.)
Note further that from (A3), any reduction in the value of output of an industry translates into
a proportionate reduction in all of the inputs, in particular,
dx˜ji
dy˜j
= aji (A5)
for each industry i. Then from (A4) and (A5), we have
dy˜i
dm˜j
≈ −dy˜i
dy˜j
= −aji
for each industry i 6= j, and we have
dy˜j
dm˜j
≈ −(1 + ajj)
for industry j itself, reflecting both direct import substitution and the resultant decline in j’s demand
for its own inputs. These two cases can be dealt with succinctly by defining dij ≡ 1{i = j}, so that
for any industries i and j
dy˜i
dm˜j
≈ −(dij + aji).
For small changes in mj , a first-order Taylor approximation gives the total impact on domestic
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production in industry i as
∆y˜i ≈ dy˜i
dm˜j
×∆m˜j ≈ −(dij + aji)×∆m˜j ,
where ∆ is the difference operator.
Now turning this into a proportional (log) effect by normalizing the impact on industry i relative
to its domestic production, we obtain
∆y˜i
y˜i
≈ dy˜i
dm˜j
×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i
≈ −(dij + aji)×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i
.
We can next compute the total effect on industry i by summing this expression across all of its
downstream (customer) sectors: n∑
j=1
dy˜i
dm˜j
×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i

first order
≈ −
n∑
j=1
(dij + aji)×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i
= −(e′i +A′i) ·∆m˜×
1
y˜i
, (A6)
where ei is a column vector whose kth element equals dik, A is the matrix of aij ’s, Ai is its ith
column, and ∆m˜ is the (column) vectors of ∆m˜j ’s. Note also that we have included input linkages
from industry i to itself (which are present in the data, since input-output relationships are measured
at relatively aggregated levels). This expression is what we use to compute first-order downstream
effects in Section 5. Specifically, the first component of this expression (−e′i ·∆m˜× 1y˜i ) corresponds
to the direct industry import effect, and the second component (−A′i ·∆m˜× 1y˜i ) corresponds to the
first-order downstream effect.54
Equation (A6) gives the predicted change in the nominal output of industry i as a function of
shocks to itself and to its downstream sectors. It is straightforward to turn this into a relationship
for the predicted change in employment in industry i given the Cobb-Douglas form of the production
function in (A1). In particular, cost minimization for industry i implies that
li = α
l
i
y˜i
w
,
where w is the market wage. Thus employment in industry i for a given wage rate (or the total wage
54Using (A3), we can rewrite the first-order downstream effect as −∑nj=1 x˜jiy˜i ∆m˜jy˜j , which clarifies that the down-
stream effect on industry i is a sales-weighted average of the proportional import shocks experienced by its customers
j. In our empirical work, import changes correspond to changes in Chinese import penetration, and the weights are
constructed using the 1992 BEA benchmark input-output table.
35
bill of industry i) is proportional to its nominal output, enabling us to write (A6) with employment
on the left-hand side.
It is clear, however, that the first-order effect cannot be isolated from higher-order effects, since
an increase in m˜j will have an impact on y˜k and from there on the sectors supplying inputs to k and
so on. Using the notation Kj for the jth column of matrix K and K2 to denote K×K and so on,
we can obtain n∑
j=1
dy˜i
dm˜j
×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i

full
= −(e′i ·∆m˜×
1
y˜i
+ (Ai)
′ ·∆m˜× 1
y˜i
+ (A2i )
′ ·∆m˜× 1
y˜i
+ . . .)
= −(e′i + (Ai)′ + (A2i )′ + . . .) ·∆m˜×
1
y˜i
= −((I−A)−1i )′ ·∆m˜×
1
y˜i
= −
n∑
j=1
lji ×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i
, (A7)
where the third equality follows since, given that αlj > 0, α
k
j > 0 and the constant returns to scale
technology, the largest eigenvalue of the matrix A is strictly less than one, and thus (I−A) is
invertible.
Here, of course, (I−A)−1 is the Leontief inverse of the matrix A, and (I−A)−1i picks its ith
column. The last equality follows by defining L ≡(I−A)−1 and denoting the entries of the matrix
L by lij . As with the first-order downstream effect derived above, this expression can be decomposed
into direct and indirect effects by writing
−
n∑
j=1
lji ×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i
= −
n∑
j=1
dij ×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i
−
n∑
j=1
(lji − dij)×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i
,
with the first term representing the direct effect and the second term representing the downstream
effect. These terms enter separately in our empirical specifications.
To derive this relationship from the full effect of an increase in imports is also informative. In
particular, recall that (A4) was an approximation, because it ignored the fact that once domestic
production in industry j declines, then there will be a decline in all of the industries supplying j
(as we have shown with the first-order effects), and then in the second round a decline in all of the
industries supplying those supplying j, and so on. To obtain the full adjustment, we need to take the
n market clearing equations given by (A2) and totally differentiate them with respect to the vector
of exports. To do this, let us first express domestic production in each industry j as a function of
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the vector of consumption levels and imports. Namely, for each j = 1, . . . , n,
y˜j =
n∑
k=1
lkj c˜k −
n∑
k=1
lkjm˜k,
where recall that lij ’s are the entries of L ≡(I−A)−1. Now totally differentiating this equation, we
obtain
dy˜i
dm˜j
= −lji.
Now repeating the same steps as above to use a first-order Taylor approximation to obtain the total
impact of the increase in imports and to convert this into proportional effects, we have
dy˜i
dm˜j
×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i
= −lji ×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i
.
Summing across j, we again obtain that n∑
j=1
dy˜i
dm˜j
×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i

full
= −
n∑
j=1
lji ×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i
,
which is the same as (A7).
Let us next turn to the upstream effects, that is, how a given industry i is affected by changes in
imports to its suppliers. Let us first proceed under the assumption that any contraction of an input-
supplying industry translates into a proportional reduction in the inputs to all of its downstream
industries. This could be, for example, because Chinese imports cannot make up for the specialized
inputs supplied by domestic U.S. industries, which are forced to shut down because of the greater
Chinese competition for consumer demand. Under this assumption, we have
dy˜i
dm˜j
= −dy˜i
dy˜j
.
Next, we calculate
dyi
dyj
=
dyi
dxij
dxij
dyj
= aij
yi
xij
dxij
dyj
,
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where the second line follows from the fact that
dyi
dxij
=
∂l
αli
i k
αki
i
n∏
i=1
x
aij
ij
∂xij
= aij
yi
xij
.
Then multiplying through by prices, and multiplying the right-hand side by yj/yj , we have
dy˜i
dy˜j
= aij
pi
pj
yj
yj
yi
xij
dxij
dyj
= aij
y˜i
y˜j
yj
xij
dxij
dyj
.
Now using the fact that contraction of any input-supplying industry leads to a proportional reduction
in the inputs to all its customers, we have dxij/dyj = xij/yj . Substituting for dxij/dyj in the previous
expression then gives
dy˜i
dy˜j
= aij
y˜i
y˜j
for i 6= j, or more generally
dy˜i
dy˜j
= (dij + aij)
y˜i
y˜j
for any i, where the indicator dij ≡ 1{i = j} again accounts for the direct impact of industry i
imports on itself.
Using the same first-order approximation as above, we can compute the impact of industry j’s
increase in imports on industry i’s domestic production as
∆y˜i ≈ dy˜i
dm˜j
×∆m˜j
= −dy˜i
dy˜j
×∆m˜j ,
where the second line follows from our assumption that import-driven contraction of domestic pro-
duction leads to proportionate reductions in input purchases by downstream industries. Substituting
for dy˜i/dy˜j and dividing through by domestic production to obtain a proportional change gives
∆y˜i
y˜i
≈ −(dij + aij) y˜i
y˜j
×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i
= −(dij + aij)×∆m˜j × 1
y˜j
.
Finally, similar to before, we can now compute the total first-order impact of the expansion in
imports coming through the combined direct and upstream effects as
38
 n∑
j=1
dy˜i
dm˜j
×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i

first order
≈ −
n∑
j=1
(dij + aij)×∆m˜j × 1
y˜j
= −(e′i + ai) · v, (A8)
where ai is the ith row of the matrix A and v is the column vector whose kth element equals
∆m˜k × 1y˜k . We use this expression to approximate first-order upstream effects in Section 5, again
separating the direct industry import effect to isolate the upstream term (ai · v).55
The full effect can again be written in terms of the Leontief inverse. In particular, letting ani
denote the ith row of the matrix An, we have n∑
j=1
dy˜i
dm˜j
×∆m˜j × 1
y˜i

full
= −(e′i · v + ai · v + a2i · v + . . .)
= −((I−A)′)−1i · v
= −
n∑
j=1
lij ×∆m˜j × 1
y˜j
, (A9)
where againKi denotes the ith column of the matrixK, ((I−A)′)−1i is the ith column of ((I−A)′)−1,
and thus the ith row of the Leontief inverse matrix of A, (I−A)−1, and L ≡(I−A)−1 with entries
denoted by lij . As with the full downstream effect, this expression can be readily decomposed into
direct and indirect (upstream) components, which enter separately in our empirical specifications.
We can also turn all of these interrelationships into changes in industry employment by following
the same argument as above.
An alternative scenario about the upstream effects is the polar opposite where an increase in
imports in industry j proportionately increases the inputs used by all downstream sectors of j.
Under this alternative assumption,
dy˜i
dm˜j
=
dy˜i
dy˜j
,
whereas previously these terms were assumed to be of opposite sign. The rest of the derivation
proceeds as above, and equations (A8) and (A9) follow readily except without the minus sign in
front. Therefore, the expressions in (A8) and (A9) capture the first-order and full upstream effects
under both scenarios regarding the use of Chinese inputs in the domestic U.S. supply chain.
55Analogously to the downstream effects, we can rewrite the first-order upstream effect as −∑nj=1 x˜ijy˜i ∆m˜jy˜j , which
shows that the upstream effect on industry i is a weighted average of the proportional import shocks experienced by
i’s suppliers, with the weights equaling i’s input purchases from each supplier divided by its total sales.
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Motivated by these observations, in our empirical work we use equations (A6)-(A9) to measure
downstream and upstream first-order and full effects.
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Figure  1.  Changes  in  U.S.  Manufacturing  and  Non-­‐‑Manufacturing  Employment,  1991-­‐‑2011.
Notes:  Employment  is  computed  in  the  County  Business  Patterns.  Employment  counts  are  
normalized  to  unity  in  1991.
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Figure  2.  Bilateral  U.S.-­‐‑China  Trade  Flows  and  Chinese  Import  Penetration,  1991-­‐‑2011.
Notes:  Trade  data  are  taken  from  the  UN  Comtrade  Database.  Imports  and  exports  are  
deflated  to  2007  U.S.$  using  the  Personal  Consumption  Expenditure  price  index.  Chinese  
import  penetration  is  constructed  by  dividing  U.S.  manufacturing  imports  from  China  by  
U.S.  domestic  manufacturing  absorption,  defined  as  U.S.  domestic  manufacturing  output  
plus  imports  less  exports.  Export  data  are  available  only  from  1992  onwards.  The  import  
penetration  ratio  series  ends  in  2009  because  computing  the  denominator  requires  use  of  
the  NBER-­‐‑CES  Manufacturing  Industry  Database,  which  ends  in  2009.
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U.S. Imports from China U.S. Exports to China
Chinese Import Penetration Ratio
1991-­‐‑1999 1999-­‐‑2011 1999-­‐‑2007 2007-­‐‑2011
N Mean/SD Median Min Max Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD
392 0.50 0.14 -­‐‑0.02 10.93 0.27 0.66 0.84 0.30
(0.94) (0.75) (1.33) (1.61) (1.68)
392 0.44 0.15 -­‐‑0.52 8.59 0.18 0.60 0.60 0.62
(0.76) (0.44) (1.07) (1.07) (1.32)
392 -­‐‑2.71 -­‐‑2.05 -­‐‑38.32 4.62 -­‐‑0.30 -­‐‑4.32 -­‐‑3.62 -­‐‑5.73
(3.07) (3.49) (3.85) (4.15) (5.02)
87 1.33 1.02 -­‐‑5.73 5.75 2.46 0.57 1.54 -­‐‑1.37
(1.46) (2.38) (1.56) (1.59) (2.83)
100  x  Annual  Log  ∆  in  Emp.  
(Non-­‐‑Manufacturing  Industries)
Notes:  For  each  manufacturing  industry,  the  change  in  U.S.  exposure  to  Chinese  imports  is  computed  by  dividing  100  
x  the  annualized  increase  in  the  value  of  U.S.  imports  over  the  indicated  period  by  1991  U.S.  market  volume  in  that  
industry.  The  instrument  is  constructed  by  dividing  100  x  the  annualized  increase  in  imports  from  China  in  a  set  of  
comparison  countries  by  1988  U.S.  market  volume  in  the  industry.  The  quantities  used  in  these  computations  are  
deflated  to  constant  dollars  using  the  Personal  Consumption  Expenditures  price  index.  Employment  changes  are  
computed  in  the  County  Business  Patterns.  All  observations  are  weighted  by  1991  industry  employment.
Table  1.  Industry-­‐‑Level  Changes  in  Chinese  Import  Exposure  and  U.S.  Manufacturing  Employment.
1991-­‐‑2011
100  x  Annual  ∆  in  U.S.  Exposure  
to  Chinese  Imports
Instrument  for  ∆  in  U.S.  
Exposure  to  Chinese  Imports
100  x  Annual  Log  ∆  in  Emp.  
(Manufacturing  Industries)
1991-­‐‑2007 1991-­‐‑1999 1999-­‐‑2011 1999-­‐‑2007 1991-­‐‑2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-­‐‑0.81*** -­‐‑1.30*** -­‐‑1.24*** -­‐‑2.30** -­‐‑1.16*** -­‐‑1.12*** -­‐‑1.49***
(0.16) (0.41) (0.37) (1.12) (0.37) (0.34) (0.47)
1{1991-­‐‑1999} -­‐‑0.30 -­‐‑0.08 0.05 0.04
(0.37) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)
1{1999-­‐‑2011} -­‐‑4.32*** -­‐‑3.79*** -­‐‑3.46***
(0.37) (0.33) (0.33)
1{1999-­‐‑2007} -­‐‑2.58***
(0.38)
Constant 0.32 -­‐‑3.55*** -­‐‑2.68*** -­‐‑1.96***
(0.43) (0.34) (0.39) (0.27)
Estimation  Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Table  2.  Effect  of  Import  Exposure  on  Employment  in  U.S.  Manufacturing  Industries:  OLS  and  2SLS  Estimates.
Dep.  Var.:  100  x  Annual  Log  ∆  in  Employment
Notes:  Columns  (1)-­‐‑(4)  report  results  from  stacking  log  employment  changes  and  changes  in  U.S.  exposure  to  
Chinese  imports  over  the  periods  1991-­‐‑1999  and  either  1999-­‐‑2011  or  1999-­‐‑2007,  as  indicated  (N  =  784  =  392  4-­‐‑digit  
manufacturing  industries  x  2  periods).  Columns  (5)-­‐‑(8)  report  results  from  regressing  the  employment  change  
over  the  indicated  period  on  the  change  in  U.S.  exposure  to  Chinese  imports  over  the  same  period  (N  =  392).  
Employment  changes  are  computed  in  the  County  Business  Patterns  and  are  expressed  as  100  x  annual  log  
changes.  In  2SLS  specifications,  the  change  in  U.S.  import  exposure  is  instrumented  as  described  in  the  text.  In  all  
specifications,  observations  are  weighted  by  1991  employment.  Standard  errors  in  parentheses  are  clustered  on  
135  3-­‐‑digit  industries  in  all  specifications.  *  p<0.10,  **  p<0.05,  ***  p<0.01.
Separately  By  Period  (N  =  392)
1991-­‐‑2011
100  x  Annual  ∆  in  U.S.  
Exposure  to  Chinese  Imports
Stacked  Differences  (N  =  784)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-­‐‑1.30*** -­‐‑0.75*** -­‐‑1.10*** -­‐‑1.33*** -­‐‑0.80*** -­‐‑0.76*** -­‐‑0.74*** -­‐‑0.60**
(0.41) (0.22) (0.35) (0.43) (0.25) (0.22) (0.23) (0.29)
1{1991-­‐‑1999} 0.05 -­‐‑0.09 0.00 0.06 -­‐‑0.08 -­‐‑0.09 -­‐‑0.10
(0.36) (0.32) (0.37) (0.36) (0.30) (0.32) (0.30)
1{1999-­‐‑2011} -­‐‑3.46*** -­‐‑3.82*** -­‐‑3.59*** -­‐‑3.44*** -­‐‑3.79*** -­‐‑3.82*** -­‐‑3.83*** -­‐‑3.79***
(0.33) (0.27) (0.35) (0.32) (0.28) (0.26) (0.27) (0.45)
1-­‐‑Digit  Mfg  Sector  Controls No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No
Production  Controls No No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Pretrend  Controls No No No Yes No Yes Yes No
Industry  Fixed  Effects No No No No No No No Yes
100  x  Annual  ∆  in  U.S.  
Exposure  to  Chinese  Imports
Table  3.  2SLS  Estimates  of  Import  Effects  on  Employment  Including  Industry-­‐‑Level  Controls.
Dep.  Var.:  100  x  Annual  Log  ∆  in  Employment
Notes:  Each  column  reports  results  from  stacking  log  employment  changes  and  changes  in  U.S.  exposure  to  
Chinese  imports  over  the  periods  1991-­‐‑1999  and  1999-­‐‑2011  (N  =  784  =  392  4-­‐‑digit  manufacturing  industries  x  2  
periods).  The  dependent  variable  is  100  x  the  annual  log  change  in  each  industry'ʹs  employment  in  the  County  
Business  Patterns  (CBP)  over  the  relevant  period.  The  regressor  is  100  x  the  annual  change  in  U.S.  exposure  to  
Chinese  imports  over  the  same  period;  it  is  instrumented  as  described  in  the  text.  Sector  controls  are  dummies  
for  10  1-­‐‑digit  manufacturing  sectors.  Production  controls  for  each  industry  include  production  workers  as  a  
share  of  total  employment,  the  log  average  wage,  and  the  ratio  of  capital  to  value  added  (in  1991);  and  
computer  investment  as  a  share  of  total  investment  and  high-­‐‑tech  equipment  as  a  share  of  total  investment  (in  
1990).  Pretrend  controls  are  changes  in  the  log  average  wage  and  in  the  industry'ʹs  share  of  total  employment  
over  1976-­‐‑1991.  In  the  final  column,  we  include  a  full  set  of  4-­‐‑digit  industry  fixed  effects.  Covariates  are  
demeaned  to  facilitate  interpretation  of  the  time  effects.  Observations  are  weighted  by  1991  employment.  
Standard  errors  in  parentheses  are  clustered  on  135  3-­‐‑digit  industries.  *  p<0.10,  **  p<0.05,  ***  p<0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1971-­‐‑1981 1981-­‐‑1991 1991-­‐‑1999 1999-­‐‑2009 1991-­‐‑2009
0.34 -­‐‑0.40 -­‐‑0.84* -­‐‑2.01*** -­‐‑1.49***
(0.33) (0.28) (0.45) (0.66) (0.51)
Constant 1.19*** -­‐‑0.68** 0.35 -­‐‑3.97*** -­‐‑2.05***
(0.30) (0.34) (0.46) (0.43) (0.29)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1971-­‐‑1981 1981-­‐‑1991 1991-­‐‑1999 1999-­‐‑2009 1991-­‐‑2009
0.20 0.03 -­‐‑0.57* -­‐‑0.91*** -­‐‑0.76***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.31) (0.31) (0.23)
Constant -­‐‑0.05 -­‐‑0.08 0.52 -­‐‑0.98** -­‐‑0.32
(0.32) (0.74) (0.63) (0.45) (0.48)
Notes:  N  =  384  4-­‐‑digit  manufacturing  industries  (we  exclude  8  industries  for  which  post-­‐‑1996  
employment  data  are  unavailable  in  the  NBER-­‐‑CES  Manufacturing  Industry  Database).  The  dependent  
variable  in  each  specification  is  100  x  the  annual  log  employment  change  over  the  indicated  period,  as  
computed  in  the  NBER-­‐‑CES  data.  The  regressor  in  each  specification  is  100  x  the  annual  change  in  U.S.  
exposure  to  Chinese  imports  over  1991-­‐‑2011,  instrumented  as  described  in  the  text.  Panel  A  includes  no  
additional  controls.  Panel  B  includes  dummies  for  10  1-­‐‑digit  manufacturing  sectors.  Observations  are  
weighted  by  1991  employment.  Standard  errors  in  parentheses  are  clustered  on  135  3-­‐‑digit  industries.  *  
p<0.10,  **  p<0.05,  ***  p<0.01.
Table  4.  2SLS  Estimates  of  Import  Effects  on  Employment  over  1971-­‐‑2009.
100  x  Annual  ∆  in  U.S.  Exposure  to  Chinese  
Imports  (computed  over  1991-­‐‑2011)
Dep.  Var.:  100  x  Annual  Log  ∆  in  Employment
A.  Excluding  1-­‐‑Digit  Mfg  Sector  Controls
B.  Including  1-­‐‑Digit  Mfg  Sector  Controls
100  x  Annual  ∆  in  U.S.  Exposure  to  Chinese  
Imports  (computed  over  1991-­‐‑2011)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Emp.
Num  
Estabs.
Emp  Per  
Estab.
Real  
Wage  
Bill
Real  
Wage
Prod.  
Emp.
Non-­‐‑
Prod.  
Emp.
Real  
Prod.  
Wage
Real  Non-­‐‑
Prod.  
Wage
Source  Dataset CBP CBP CBP CBP CBP NBER NBER NBER NBER
-­‐‑0.75*** -­‐‑0.23*** -­‐‑0.52*** -­‐‑0.67*** 0.08 -­‐‑0.99*** -­‐‑0.78*** 0.24** -­‐‑0.05
(0.22) (0.09) (0.17) (0.21) (0.06) (0.31) (0.29) (0.11) (0.09)
1{1991-­‐‑1999} -­‐‑0.09 0.48** -­‐‑0.57** 1.53*** 1.63*** 0.33 -­‐‑0.20 1.13*** 1.81***
(0.32) (0.19) (0.26) (0.30) (0.08) (0.38) (0.34) (0.06) (0.09)
1{1999-­‐‑2011}  or  1{1999-­‐‑2009} -­‐‑3.82*** -­‐‑1.51*** -­‐‑2.31*** -­‐‑3.42*** 0.40*** -­‐‑4.84*** -­‐‑3.63*** 0.22 0.32***
(0.27) (0.19) (0.18) (0.30) (0.10) (0.37) (0.31) (0.14) (0.11)
1-­‐‑Digit  Mfg  Sector  Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1{1991-­‐‑1999} -­‐‑0.30 0.41** -­‐‑0.71*** 1.35*** 1.65*** 0.06 -­‐‑0.40 1.19*** 1.80***
(0.32) (0.19) (0.26) (0.31) (0.07) (0.38) (0.33) (0.06) (0.08)
1{1999-­‐‑2011}  or  1{1999-­‐‑2009} -­‐‑4.32*** -­‐‑1.67*** -­‐‑2.66*** -­‐‑3.87*** 0.46*** -­‐‑5.38*** -­‐‑4.06*** 0.35** 0.30**
(0.25) (0.17) (0.17) (0.29) (0.08) (0.34) (0.32) (0.14) (0.13)
Table  5.  2SLS  Estimates  of  Import  Effects  on  Additional  Labor  Market  Outcomes.
Dep.  Var.:  100  x  Annual  Log  ∆  in  Indicated  Outcome
100  x  Annual  ∆  in  U.S.  
Exposure  to  Chinese  Imports
Notes:  Source  dataset  indicates  the  dataset  used  to  compute  the  indicated  outcome  (CBP  =  County  Business  Patterns,  
NBER  =  NBER-­‐‑CES  Manufacturing  Industry  Database).  Each  column  stacks  changes  in  the  indicated  outcome  and  
changes  in  U.S.  exposure  to  Chinese  imports  over  the  periods  1991-­‐‑1999  and  either  1999-­‐‑2011  (for  CBP  outcomes)  or  
1999-­‐‑2009  (for  NBER-­‐‑CES  outcomes).  In  columns  (1)-­‐‑(5),  N  =  784  =  392  4-­‐‑digit  manufacturing  industries  x  2  periods.  In  
columns  (6)-­‐‑(9),  we  exclude  8  industries  for  which  post-­‐‑1996  data  are  unavailable  in  the  NBER-­‐‑CES,  yielding  N  =  768  =  
384  industries  x  2  periods.  In  each  column,  the  dependent  variable  is  100  x  the  annual  log  change  in  the  indicated  
quantity.  Panel  A  reports  2SLS  estimates  including  the  annual  change  in  U.S.  exposure  to  Chinese  imports  over  the  
relevant  period;  it  is  instrumented  as  described  in  the  text.  Panel  B  reports  OLS  estimates  from  a  regression  including  
only  time  effects  and  sector  controls.    All  specifications  include  dummies  for  10  1-­‐‑digit  manufacturing  sectors,  which  
are  demeaned  to  facilitate  interpretation  of  the  time  effects.  Observations  are  weighted  by  1991  employment  in  the  
relevant  dataset.  Standard  errors  in  parentheses  are  clustered  on  135  3-­‐‑digit  industries.  *  p<0.10,  **  p<0.05,  ***  p<0.01.
A.  2SLS  Estimates
B.  Dependent  Variable  Means  by  Time  Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Direct  Import  Shock -­‐‑1.17*** -­‐‑1.28*** -­‐‑0.72*** -­‐‑1.14*** -­‐‑1.11** -­‐‑0.69*** -­‐‑1.07***
(0.42) (0.49) (0.22) (0.42) (0.48) (0.22) (0.38)
Downstream  Import  Shock -­‐‑2.21* -­‐‑2.44** -­‐‑1.03** -­‐‑6.63** -­‐‑6.88** -­‐‑2.70** -­‐‑2.64** -­‐‑1.72** -­‐‑3.06***
(1.14) (1.13) (0.45) (2.79) (2.97) (1.26) (1.32) (0.75) (1.09)
Upstream  Import  Shock 2.31 -­‐‑5.80 -­‐‑0.67
(2.66) (7.43) (3.69)
-­‐‑1.35***
(0.38)
Direct  Import  Shock -­‐‑1.20*** -­‐‑1.30*** -­‐‑0.72*** -­‐‑1.18*** -­‐‑1.14** -­‐‑0.71*** -­‐‑1.12***
(0.42) (0.49) (0.22) (0.42) (0.48) (0.22) (0.38)
Downstream  Import  Shock -­‐‑1.64* -­‐‑1.78** -­‐‑0.85** -­‐‑3.19 -­‐‑3.17 -­‐‑1.90** -­‐‑1.86** -­‐‑1.29** -­‐‑2.10***
(0.84) (0.82) (0.37) (2.14) (2.27) (0.86) (0.91) (0.59) (0.75)
Upstream  Import  Shock 1.74 -­‐‑4.26 -­‐‑0.68
(2.10) (5.94) (2.95)
-­‐‑1.32***
(0.37)
Sector  x  Period  Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1-­‐‑Digit  Mfg  Sector  Controls   No No Yes No No No No Yes No No
Exclude  2007-­‐‑2011 No No No No No No No No Yes No
Notes:  The  sample  consists  of  392  manufacturing  industries  (columns  1-­‐‑3),  87  non-­‐‑manufacturing  industries  (4-­‐‑
5),  or  both  sets  of  industries  pooled  (6-­‐‑10).  Each  column  stacks  changes  in  log  employment  and  changes  in  
import  exposure  over  the  periods  1991-­‐‑1999  and  either  1999-­‐‑2011  (columns  1-­‐‑8,  10)  or  1999-­‐‑2007  (9).  The  
dependent  variable  is  100  x  the  annual  log  change  in  employment,  as  computed  in  the  County  Business  
Patterns.  The  direct  import  shock  to  industry  i  equals  100  x  the  annual  change  in  U.S.  exposure  to  Chinese  
imports.  In  panel  A,  the  downstream  (respectively,  upstream)  import  shock  to  a  given  industry  is  a  weighted  
average  of  the  direct  import  shocks  to  its  customers  (suppliers),  as  identified  by  the  Bureau  of  Economic  
Analysis'ʹs  1992  input-­‐‑output  table.  In  panel  B,  we  use  the  Leontief  inverse  of  the  input-­‐‑output  matrix  to  
incorporate  higher-­‐‑order  linkages.  The  direct,  upstream,  and  downstream  import  shocks  are  instrumented  
using  changes  in  comparison  countries'ʹ  exposure  to  Chinese  imports.  See  text  for  details.  In  column  (10),  the  
combined  shock  is  defined  as  the  sum  of  the  direct  and  downstream  import  shocks  used  in  the  other  columns;  
we  include  separate  instruments  for  the  direct  and  downstream  components  of  the  combined  shock.  Columns  
(1)-­‐‑(5)  include  dummies  for  each  time  period.  Columns  (6)-­‐‑(10)  include  sector  (manufacturing/non-­‐‑
manufacturing)  x  period  interactions.  Where  indicated,  we  include  dummies  for  10  1-­‐‑digit  manufacturing  
sectors  (which  equal  zero  for  non-­‐‑manufacturing  industries).  Observations  are  weighted  by  1991  industry  
employment,  and  standard  errors  in  parentheses  are  clustered  on  3-­‐‑digit  industry  (with  each  non-­‐‑
manufacturing  industry  constituting  its  own  cluster).  *  p<0.10,  **  p<0.05,  ***  p<0.01.
Mfg.  Inds.
(N  =  784)
Non-­‐‑Mfg.  Inds.
(N  =  174)
Pooling  Mfg.  and  Non-­‐‑Mfg.  Inds.
(N  =  958)
Table  6.  2SLS  Estimates  of  Import  Effects  on  Employment  Incorporating  Input-­‐‑Output  Linkages.
Dep.  Var.:  100  x  Annual  Log  ∆  in  Employment
B.  Full  (Higher-­‐‑Order)  Input-­‐‑Output  Linkages
A.  First-­‐‑Order  Input-­‐‑Output  Linkages
Combined  Import  Shock
(Direct  +  Downstream)
Combined  Import  Shock
(Direct  +  Downstream)
Overall Sectoral
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-­‐‑1.64*** -­‐‑1.95*** -­‐‑1.70** -­‐‑1.89***
(0.46) (0.62) (0.78) (0.65)
-­‐‑1.95*** -­‐‑2.14*** -­‐‑1.68*** -­‐‑1.66***
(0.16) (0.30) (0.24) (0.19)
-­‐‑0.01 0.04 -­‐‑0.00 -­‐‑0.05
(0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
0.33 0.15 -­‐‑0.01 -­‐‑0.18
(0.39) (0.44) (0.57) (0.55)
Sector  x  Time  Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector  x  Mfg  Emp  Share  at  Baseline   No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector  x  Census  Division  Dummies   No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
N 1444 1444 1444 4332 4332 4332 1444 4332
Table  7.  2SLS  Estimates  of  Import  Effects  on  Commuting  Zone  Employment-­‐‑to-­‐‑Population  Ratios.
Dep.  Var.:  100  x  Annual  ∆  in  Local  Employment  /  Local  Working-­‐‑Age  Population
Notes:  Each  column  reports  results  from  stacking  changes  in  commuting  zone  employment  rates  and  
exposure  to  Chinese  imports  over  the  periods  1991-­‐‑1999  and  either  1999-­‐‑2011  (columns  1-­‐‑6)  or  1999-­‐‑2007  (7-­‐‑8).  
In  columns  (1),  (2),  (3),  and  (7),  the  dependent  variable  is  100  x  the  annual  change  in  the  ratio  of  total  
employment  to  working-­‐‑age  population  (N  =  1444  =  722  commuting  zones  x  2  periods).  In  the  other  columns,  
the  dependent  variable  is  100  x  the  annual  change  in  the  ratio  of  sectoral  employment  to  working-­‐‑age  
population,  with  industries  partitioned  into  three  sectors:  industries  exposed  to  trade  competition,  non-­‐‑
exposed  industries  that  produce  tradable  goods,  and  all  remaining  non-­‐‑exposed  industries  (N  =  4332  =  722  
commuting  zones  x  3  sectors  x  2  periods).  See  text  for  details.  The  commuting  zone  import  shock  is  an  
employment-­‐‑weighted  average  of  annualized  changes  in  Chinese  import  exposure  within  local  industries;  it  
is  instrumented  as  described  in  the  text.  Employment  is  computed  in  the  County  Business  Patterns;  
population  data  come  from  the  Census  Population  Estimates.  The  manufacturing  share  of  baseline  
commuting  zone  employment  is  computed  in  1991  (for  the  1991-­‐‑1999  period)  or  1999  (for  the  1999-­‐‑2011  and  
1999-­‐‑2007  periods).  Census  division  dummies  control  for  9  Census  divisions.  Observations  are  weighted  by  
1991  commuting  zone  population.  Standard  errors  in  parentheses  are  clustered  on  commuting  zone.  *  p<0.10,  
**  p<0.05,  ***  p<0.01.
1991-­‐‑2011 1991-­‐‑2011 1991-­‐‑2007
Sectoral  EmploymentOverall  Employment
Commuting  Zone  Import  Shock
Commuting  Zone  Import  Shock
x  1{Exposed  Sector}
Commuting  Zone  Import  Shock
x  1{Non-­‐‑Exposed  Tradable  Sector}
Commuting  Zone  Import  Shock
x  1{Non-­‐‑Exposed  Non-­‐‑Tradable  Sector}
Specification Unit  of  Analysis Description Affected  Sector(s) 1991-­‐‑1999 1999-­‐‑2011 1991-­‐‑2011 1991-­‐‑2007
Table  2,  Columns  3/4 Industry Direct  effect  of  import  exposure Manufacturing -­‐‑277 -­‐‑560 -­‐‑837 -­‐‑853
Table  6A,  Columns  6/9 Industry Total -­‐‑556 -­‐‑1581 -­‐‑2137 -­‐‑2218
Manufacturing -­‐‑404 -­‐‑928 -­‐‑1332 -­‐‑1414
Non-­‐‑manufacturing -­‐‑152 -­‐‑653 -­‐‑805 -­‐‑804
Table  6B,  Columns  6/9 Industry Total -­‐‑645 -­‐‑1979 -­‐‑2624 -­‐‑2669
Manufacturing -­‐‑421 -­‐‑985 -­‐‑1406 -­‐‑1475
Non-­‐‑manufacturing -­‐‑224 -­‐‑994 -­‐‑1218 -­‐‑1194
Table  7,  Column  6/9 Commuting  Zone Total -­‐‑743 -­‐‑2367 -­‐‑3110 -­‐‑3031
Exposed  industries -­‐‑737 -­‐‑2348 -­‐‑3086 -­‐‑2663
Non-­‐‑exposed  tradables 0 -­‐‑1 -­‐‑1 -­‐‑79
Other  non-­‐‑exposed -­‐‑5 -­‐‑17 -­‐‑23 -­‐‑289
Notes:  Reported  quantities  represent  the  change  in  employment  attributed  to  instrumented  changes  in  import  exposure  in  each  of  our  preferred  
specifications.  Negative  values  indicate  that  import  exposure  is  estimated  to  have  reduced  employment.  For  the  industry-­‐‑level  analyses,  we  first  use  the  
estimated  coefficients  to  predict  the  changes  in  each  industry'ʹs  log  employment  induced  by  changes  in  import  exposure  over  the  periods  1991-­‐‑1999  and  
1999-­‐‑2011.  Concretely,  we  multiply  the  coefficient  of  interest  by  the  observed  change  in  import  exposure,  then  multiply  this  product  by  .56  (the  partial  R-­‐‑
squared  from  our  baseline  first-­‐‑stage  regression).  We  then  use  each  industry'ʹs  observed  end-­‐‑of-­‐‑period  employment  to  convert  these  estimates  from  logs  
into  levels.  Downstream  effects  are  handled  similarly.  For  the  commuting-­‐‑zone  analyses,  we  first  use  observed  changes  in  imports  per  worker—again  
discounted  by  .56—to  predict  the  trade-­‐‑induced  change  in  each  commuting  zone'ʹs  employment-­‐‑to-­‐‑population  ratio  within  the  indicated  sectors  over  
the  periods  1991-­‐‑1999  and  1999-­‐‑2011.  We  then  multiply  by  end-­‐‑of-­‐‑period  commuting  zone  working-­‐‑age  population  to  compute  the  implied  changes  in  
each  sector'ʹs  employment  in  each  commuting  zone.  Summing  these  sectoral  estimates  across  commuting  zones  yields  nationwide  estimates.  See  the  text  
for  definitions  of  the  exposed,  non-­‐‑exposed  tradable,  and  non-­‐‑exposed  non-­‐‑tradable  sectors.  For  both  industry-­‐‑level  and  commuting-­‐‑zone-­‐‑level  
analyses,  predictions  for  1991-­‐‑2011  equal  the  sum  of  the  predictions  for  the  two  subperiods.  Predicted  employment  changes  for  the  period  1991-­‐‑2007  are  
computed  similarly,  using  coefficients  from  models  estimated  over  the  stacked  periods  1991-­‐‑1999  and  1999-­‐‑2007.
Direct  and  "ʺfirst-­‐‑order"ʺ  downstream  
effects  of  import  exposure
Effect  of  local  import  exposure  on  
employment  in  the  commuting  zone,  
controlling  for  baseline  manufacturing  
share  and  for  Census  divisions
Direct  and  "ʺfull"ʺ  (higher-­‐‑order)  
downstream  effects  of  import  exposure
Table  8.  Implied  Employment  Changes  Induced  by  Changes  in  Exposure  to  Chinese  Imports.
Implied  Employment  Changes  (000s)
Notes:  Each  point  represents  a  4-­‐‑digit  manufacturing  industry  (N  =  392).  The  change  in  
U.S.  exposure  to  Chinese  imports  is  defined  as  the  change  in  U.S.  imports  from  China  
divided  by  1991  U.S.  market  volume;  the  change  in  the  comparison  countries'ʹ  
exposure  to  Chinese  imports  is  defined  as  the  change  in  these  countries'ʹ  imports  from  
China  divided  by  1988  U.S.  market  volume.  Lines  are  fitted  by  OLS  regression,  
weighting  by  each  industry'ʹs  1991  employment  in  the  County  Business  Patterns.  The  
95%  confidence  interval  is  based  on  standard  errors  clustered  on  135  3-­‐‑digit  industries.  
The  slope  coefficient  is  .98  with  standard  error  .14;  the  regression  has  an  R-­‐‑squared  of  
.62.
Appendix  Figure  1.  First  Stage  Regression,  1991-­‐‑2011.
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100 x Annual Change in Comparison Countries’ Exposure
Change in Import Exposure Fitted Values
95% Confidence Interval
Mean SD Min Max
Production  Workers'ʹ  Share  of  Employment,  1991 68.43 15.50 18.72 97.62
Ratio  of  Capital  to  Value  Added,  1991 0.92 0.55 0.19 3.52
Log  Real  Wage  (2007  U.S.$),  1991 10.54 0.29 9.78 11.09
Computer  Investment  As  Share  of  Total,  1990 6.56 6.07 0.00 43.48
High-­‐‑Tech  Equipment  As  Share  of  Total  Investment,  1990 8.24 4.84 1.20 18.25
Change  in  Industry  Share  of  Total  Employment,  1976-­‐‑1991 -­‐‑0.03 0.07 -­‐‑0.42 0.07
Change  in  Log  Real  Wage,  1976-­‐‑1991 3.57 9.94 -­‐‑32.01 48.06
Notes:  N  =  392  4-­‐‑digit  manufacturing  industries.  Observations  are  weighted  by  industry  employment  in  
1991,  as  measured  in  the  County  Business  Patterns.  Production  workers'ʹ  share,  the  ratio  of  capital  to  value  
added,  log  real  wage,  and  the  changes  in  industry  employment  share  and  in  log  real  wage  are  computed  
using  the  NBER-­‐‑CES  Manufacturing  Industry  Database;  total  employment  in  1976  and  1991  is  computed  
from  the  Current  Employment  Statistics.  The  remaining  control  variables  are  taken  from  Autor,  Dorn,  
Hanson,  and  Song  (2014).  Share  variables  are  expressed  in  percentage  points.
Appendix  Table  1.  Industry-­‐‑Level  Control  Variables.
(1) (2) (3)
Nominal  
Shipments
Real  
Shipments
Shipments  
Deflator
-­‐‑1.08*** -­‐‑0.17 -­‐‑0.91**
(0.32) (0.44) (0.42)
1-­‐‑Digit  Mfg  Sector  Controls Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3)
Nominal  
Shipments
Real  
Shipments
Shipments  
Deflator
-­‐‑1.00** -­‐‑0.86** -­‐‑0.14*
(0.47) (0.41) (0.08)
1-­‐‑Digit  Mfg  Sector  Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes:  Each  column  stacks  changes  in  the  indicated  outcome  and  changes  in  
U.S.  exposure  to  Chinese  imports  over  the  periods  1991-­‐‑1999  and  1999-­‐‑2009.  
In  panel  A,  the  sample  consists  of  384  4-­‐‑digit  manufacturing  industries  for  
which  data  are  consistently  available  in  the  NBER-­‐‑CES  Manufacturing  
Industry  Database  (N  =  768  =  384  industries  x  2  periods).  In  panel  B,  we  
exclude  28  computer-­‐‑producing  industries  corresponding  to  NAICS  334  (N  
=  712  =  356  industries  x  2  periods);  see  Acemoglu,  Autor,  Dorn,  Hanson,  and  
Price  (2014)  for  further  details  on  the  definition  of  these  industries.  The  
dependent  variable  in  each  column  is  100  x  the  annual  log  change  in  the  
indicated  outcome,  as  computed  in  the  NBER-­‐‑CES.  The  change  in  U.S.  
exposure  to  Chinese  imports  is  instrumented  as  described  in  the  text.  All  
specifications  include  time  effects  as  well  as  controls  for  10  1-­‐‑digit  
manufacturing  sectors.  Observations  are  weighted  by  1991  employment  in  
the  NBER-­‐‑CES.  Standard  errors  in  parentheses  are  clustered  on  3-­‐‑digit  
industries.  *  p<0.10,  **  p<0.05,  ***  p<0.01.
Appendix  Table  2.  Import  Effects  on  Gross  Output  and  Price  Deflators.
Dep.  Var.:  100  x  Annual  Log  ∆  in  Indicated  Outcome
A.  All  Manufacturing  Industries  (N  =  768)
100  x  Annual  ∆  in  U.S.  
Exposure  to  Chinese  Imports
B.  Exclude  Computer  Industries  (N  =  712)
100  x  Annual  ∆  in  U.S.  
Exposure  to  Chinese  Imports
Mean/SD Median Min Max Mean/SD Median Min Max
Direct  Import  Shocks
0.50 0.14 -­‐‑0.02 10.93
(0.94)
0.44 0.15 -­‐‑0.52 8.59
(0.76)
First-­‐‑Order  Indirect  Shocks
0.16 0.06 0.00 1.88 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.19
(0.26) (0.04)
0.12 0.05 0.00 1.55 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.22
(0.18) (0.03)
0.10 0.07 0.00 0.83 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.24
(0.11) (0.04)
0.09 0.07 -­‐‑0.02 0.46 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.14
(0.08) (0.03)
Full  (Higher-­‐‑Order)  Indirect  Shocks
0.24 0.09 0.00 1.98 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.67
(0.35) (0.07)
0.19 0.10 0.00 1.61 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.65
(0.25) (0.06)
0.14 0.11 0.00 1.05 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.33
(0.13) (0.05)
0.14 0.12 -­‐‑0.01 0.61 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.21
(0.10) (0.04)
Appendix  Table  3.  Direct,  Downstream,  and  Upstream  Import  Shocks,  1991-­‐‑2011.
Manufacturing  Industries  (N  =  392) Non-­‐‑Manufacturing  Industries  (N  =  87)
Notes:  The  direct  import  shock  to  industry  i  is  defined  as  the  100  x  the  annual  change  in  U.S.  exposure  to  Chinese  
imports  in  that  industry  over  1991-­‐‑2011.  The  first-­‐‑order  downstream  (respectively,  first-­‐‑order  upstream)  import  
shock  to  i  is  a  weighted  average  of  the  direct  import  shocks  to  its  customers  (suppliers)  j,  where  the  weight  on  
industry  j  equals  i'ʹs  sales  to  (i'ʹs  purchases  from)  j  divided  by  i'ʹs  total  sales.  The  full  downstream  and  upstream  
import  shocks  are  constructed  using  the  Leontief  inverse  of  the  input-­‐‑output  matrix  to  incorporate  higher-­‐‑order  
linkages;  see  text  for  details.  Instruments  for  the  direct,  downstream,  and  upstream  import  shocks  are  constructed  
analogously,  using  changes  in  comparison  countries'ʹ  exposure  to  Chinese  imports  in  own,  downstream,  and  
upstream  industries.  Observations  are  weighted  by  1991  industry  employment  in  the  County  Business  Patterns.
Direct  Shock
Instrument  for  Direct  Shock
Upstream  Shock
Instrument  for  Upstream  Shock
Downstream  Shock
Instrument  for  Downstream  Shock
Downstream  Shock
Instrument  for  Downstream  Shock
Upstream  Shock
Instrument  for  Upstream  Shock
Mean/SD Median Min Max Mean/SD Median Min Max
∆  in  Local  Exposure  to  Chinese  Imports
0.05 0.04 0.00 0.95 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.69
(0.05) (0.07)
0.04 0.04 -­‐‑0.06 0.53 0.13 0.12 -­‐‑0.01 0.79
(0.04) (0.09)
∆  in  Employment/Working-­‐‑Age  Pop
0.73 0.73 -­‐‑1.15 3.48 -­‐‑0.52 -­‐‑0.58 -­‐‑2.16 2.63
(0.39) (0.40)
-­‐‑0.03 -­‐‑0.04 -­‐‑1.90 1.21 -­‐‑0.30 -­‐‑0.30 -­‐‑1.55 0.64
(0.16) (0.17)
-­‐‑0.04 -­‐‑0.04 -­‐‑0.70 1.47 -­‐‑0.07 -­‐‑0.08 -­‐‑0.85 1.52
(0.10) (0.08)
0.80 0.82 -­‐‑0.62 3.21 -­‐‑0.14 -­‐‑0.14 -­‐‑1.82 1.34
(0.32) (0.32)
Notes:  N  =  722  commuting  zones.  The  annual  change  in  commuting  zone  exposure  to  Chinese  imports  is  a  
weighted  average  of  changes  in  U.S.  import  exposure  in  392  4-­‐‑digit  manufacturing  industries,  where  the  
weights  are  start-­‐‑of-­‐‑period  employment  shares  within  the  commuting  zone.  The  instrument  is  constructed  by  
replacing  U.S.  imports  from  China  with  imports  from  China  by  a  set  of  comparison  countries,  and  by  using  
1988  commuting-­‐‑zone  employment  shares  as  weights;  see  text  for  details.  Imports  are  deflated  to  constant  
dollars  using  the  Personal  Consumption  Expenditures  price  index.  In  the  second  panel,  each  variable  describes  
the  annual  change  in  100  x  total  or  sectoral  employment  divided  by  the  commuting-­‐‑zone  population  between  
the  ages  of  15  and  64.  Exposed  industries  include  manufacturing  industries  for  which  the  predicted  increase  in  
Chinese  import  penetration  exceeds  2  percentage  points  between  1991  and  2011,  plus  industries  for  which  the  
predicted  downstream  increase  in  Chinese  import  penetration  (incorporating  higher-­‐‑order  linkages)  exceeds  4  
percentage  points  over  1991-­‐‑2011.  Among  non-­‐‑exposed  industries,  we  define  agriculture,  forestry,  fishing,  
mining,  and  manufacturing  industries  as  tradable  and  all  other  industries  as  non-­‐‑tradable.  Employment  is  
computed  in  the  County  Business  Patterns,  and  population  is  computed  using  the  Census  Population  
Estimates.  Observations  are  weighted  by  total  1991  commuting-­‐‑zone  population.
1999-­‐‑2011
100  x  Annual  ∆  in  Emp/Pop  within
Non-­‐‑Exposed  Tradable  Industries
100  x  Annual  ∆  in  Emp/Pop  within
Other  Non-­‐‑Exposed  Industries
Appendix  Table  4.  Changes  in  Commuting  Zone  Import  Exposure  and  Employment-­‐‑to-­‐‑Population  Ratios.
1991-­‐‑1999
100  x  Annual  ∆  in  Commuting  Zone  
Exposure  to  Chinese  Imports
Instrument  for  ∆  in  Commuting  Zone  
Exposure  to  Chinese  Imports
100  x  Annual  ∆  in  Overall  Emp/Pop
100  x  Annual  ∆  in  Emp/Pop  within
Exposed  Industries
